Of Camels. Roosters an Failed States

Of Camels, Roosters and Failed States

The Shabab al Mujahideen Movement of Somalia has offered a reward of 10 camels for the disclosure of the ‘idiot’ Obama’s whereabouts and 10 chickens and roosters for the same for Hillary Clinton. Gender bias apart and the attendant lesser reward for Ms. Hillary Clinton, the tit for tat reward game and the implied mockery suggests that the Shabab cares does not care a  whit about the United States, the designation of Shabab as a terror outfit or the bounty on the heads of Shabab’s members. What are the implications of this? What does the phenomenon of failed states such as Somalia mean for the international system and global security? And what should the United States strategy and approach be towards failed states and the terror organizations/outfits these spawn?

First, a word on failed states. The definition of a failed state is drawn from the minimalist definition of a state and then counterpoised against it. A state, in the Weberian formulation is an entity that has a monopoly over legitimate means of violence. It is sovereign over its territory, provides governance functions in this territory and this sovereign status is recognized by other members of the international state system. A failed state conversely is a state where the monopoly over legitimate violence is broken down and competing centres of power-tribes, warlords, terrorists or gangs- view for this space. It does not discharge its governance function and its relations with other states that constitute the international system are dysfunctional or even predatory. Afghanistan, Sudan, and the ‘state’ in contention Somalia spring to mind immediately as examples of failed states.

These states are predatory entities that employ predatory tactics on their own citizens and other states. And in the modern world, they are incubation centres and grounds of that modern day scourge: terrorism. As such, they constitute a clear and present danger to the international system and global security. They generate refugee flows,  piracy, tax the already taxed resource of international organizations, generate chaos and insecurity in their neighborhoods and as September 11 demonstrates serve as staging posts for vicious and horrible attacks on other countries. That they constitute a problem  and a scourge is clear. The question is what to do about the failed state phenomenon?

 The current US approach suggests that given the distance of the failed states from the homeland or the west, failed states are best left to their own devices with an odd statement from the State Department and bounties on gangs, terror outfits that constitute failed states as a strategy of dealing with these. This approach is myopic for reasons delineated earlier. Failed states to repeat constitute clear and present danger to global security and they need to be dealt with. Left to their own devices and wallow in their state or condition, failed states can only get emboldened and become not only parasitic on the international system but also present security problems. The issue is of nurturing them back to health. This requires a clear cut strategy towards failed states. Who does the onus of nurturing failed states fall on and how can this be done?

The responsibility of nannying failed states to health and render them as fully functioning, healthy and normal states falls on the United States. This is because the United States is the custodian of the Westphalian state system and it is also its national interest and perhaps a national security prerogative to pre-empt situations and ghastly events like September 11. In an era of extensive and intensive globalization, security problems in a remote distant corner of the globe can have a spill over effect on the advanced security communities of the west. Refugee flows, and in an extreme rendition, September II is a classic example of this. It then behooves the United States to take a view on failed states, devise a strategy and vigorously act on it. What could be the premises and components of such an approach or strategy?

The sole superpower should be clear about the pitfalls of failed states. The strategy it could employ in dealing with these dysfunctional states must have both a hard power and soft power approach. In terms of the former, the United States must be clear about the premises and terms of military intervention in the 21st century. It should forge a consensus within about the desirability and prudence of military intervention. This is because nurturing failed states to health is notgoing to be a cakewalk. It will meet with resistance and this resistance can only be dealt with by force. The United States should then not be squeamish about employing force and view its employment in prudent terms. In blunt terms, this means invading and occupying.  (It is, given the salubrious effects and consequences, well worth the attempt even if the potential intervention is deemed as a ‘neo imperial crusade and adventure). 

Second, the United States should complement the hard power strategy/approach with a soft power component. This means that the country be ready to expend resources, men and material to build and develop the institutions of the state from the ashes. Aid in the form of monies, technical support, developing political and I economic infrastructure, resolving conflicts among contending parties and forging democratic institutions should inform the gravamen of this approach. The aim and endgame should be to create a fully functioning state that is able to discharge governance functions to its citizens. To use a metaphor from business, this approach should be modeled on the built, operate and transfer concept.  It is only after the fully functioning state institutions are developed, democracy established and economic growth instituted that the United States should think of exiting.( The hurried and harried exit from Afghanistan is a case in point of the obverse and converse).