Another American Century: Implications on World Order and Security

The end of structural bipolarity meant the America stood at the apex of power and there was no peer competitor to it. This condition came to the known as unipolarity. Given balancing power is almost akin to a law of international relations, this condition was held to be an aberrant interlude in world politics. It was assumed that world politics would return to equilibrium and the American preponderance of power would be balanced by either a group of states or a peer competitor. The EU was assumed to take over this role by some while as others held that China would be the peer competitor and other pole of power in either a loosely multi-polar or bipolar world.

  

Neither prognostication has turned out to be true. America continues to enjoy pre-eminence at least in the hard dimensions of power. While its soft power may have been dented by the second Gulf war especially its inclination to go it alone if need be and the 2008 economic crisis, it remains peerless in most dimensions and indices of power. The European Union mired in various structural problems relating to its widening and deepening and its structural inability to forge a coherent front in its external relations and foreign policy is a bit of a non player in international politics. It may never be able to throw its weigh and clout around internationally and may be condemned to wallow in the domain of ‘low politics. It is perhaps core Europe-the French German combine-that will ultimately determine the international orientation of the EU.

China is altogether, in a different league. It is, as is well known, an authoritarian regime  and a one party state that adheres to Maxism Leninism but has borrowed aspects of capitalism to manage its economy. Its economic growth and power may give it some authority and influence but in the great game of international politics, economic growth alone does not suffice. Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be modernizing and have developed some novel capabilities, but essentially it lacks the power projection capabilities of powers, say, like the United States. More importantly, China, on account of its nature, lacks that important aspect of power. That is, soft power.

Soft power is more than the ability to attract. It flows and accrues from a nation’s inherent attributes and qualities. It can neither be bought nor purchased. It can only be cultivated  and developed delicately through a nation building exercise and an international orientation that is so compelling that others(nations and peoples) feel drawn to the nation that displays such attributes. The United States has and can draw upon reservoirs of soft power. This, conversely to China, accrue from its very nature. An immigrant nation and a liberal democracy state that is predicated upon what Thomas Paine called the rights of man, and whose foreign policy can dictate the rhythms and gravamen of world politics, soft power is inherent to the idea of the United States. Its openness and the buying of the ‘American Dream’ by a host of diverse peoples is one indication and reflection of its soft power.

Further, the United States, after the second Great War, it could be said became the hegemon by default. It exercised this benign hegemony by building a world order and system from the ashes of war. The Marshal Plan in Europe, injecting life into international institutions and rebuilding Japan were all components of this liberal order building project. The heart of this liberal project was to build a system wherein nations and states developed a stake in the system and a voice in it. This accorded the American led project legitimacy and a leadership position was given to it willingly by other nations.  This could also be an aspect of American soft power and was built with great foresight, diligence, prudence, leadership and statesmanship.

This order has endured and may, among other things, have been one reason for the external dimension of the end of the Cold War. The question is what is the future of this order in the next century or so? What should be America’s role in it? And what are the implications for world politics?

All word orders are inherently fragile. The history and trajectory of the Westphalian system is testimony to this. So the world order brought to fruition by the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War needs to be carefully nurtured. And it is only the United States that can do this. This is because of the fund of both hard and soft power available to it. Whilst there are no peer competitors in sight to the United States, this condition may not hold indefinitely. An axis like power combination that brings together Iran, China and other revisionist powers may arise to challenge this order. The watch word is prudence and eternal vigilance.  The United State’s role and orientation becomes indispensable in this schema.  It can neither afford to afford to retreat into fortress America not scale back its foreign ‘entanglements’.

The country will remain peerless and at the apex of power for decades. However, it is the use of this power that may determine the future of the world order it helped bring about. It must pull back and peer into history and heed its lessons. One insight that it could do well to employ is that legitimacy is a cardinal principle of politics and by making its power legitimate to others, the country not only ensures its position of primacy but also help maintain world order. This legitimacy obviates obstructionism and churlishness by other states and helps them develop a stake and voice in international politics. Undoubtedly, given the power available to the United States, this may be reflexively difficult. However, it is the only prudent way and method. If the United States becomes a ‘listener’, is sympathetic and gives voice and space to others, then it may a fund of legitimacy to draw upon. And in the process, others will gravitate to it and seek its leadership.

This has implications for world order and politics. Specifically and concretely, it means expanding the system of alliances it has build and accommodate rising and emerging powers like India, perhaps Brazil and making China into what Bill Clinton called a stakeholder in the international system. This requires astute diplomacy and sagacity and is by no means impossible. The future of the world order may come to depend upon this.

  

Alarmist prognostications of American decline are hogwash. The country is not in decline and its imprimatur on world politics is indelible. However, for the sake of world order and maintaining its position of primacy, it behooves the United States to stock take , review and reassess. World order and peace may depend upon United State’s role and orientation. And this can only be the country’s national interest. There is no one  out there who can either take over or supplant the indispensable nation. Let the country make haste slowly and rededicate itself to a role that falls on it by default.