Will the United States exit from Afghanistan lead to Pakistani recidivism and violence in Kashmir, asks Wajahat Qazi?
The date for the drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan is approaching. This lead up to the exit is creating angst across the globe and in India in particular. It is believed that the withdrawl, whatever its reasons, will lead the extremist forces, inimical to peace and stability and proponents of global jihad to believe that they have emerged victorious. And that this will be an eerie echo of the end of the Cold War era, the ignonimous Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the United States estrangement from Pakistan.
This insalubrious development, it is held, will encourage the forces of recidivism and global jihad and will have serious implications on both regional and global security. In India, the security and defence establishment believes that the US exit from Afghanistan will relieve pressure on Pakistan and the United States drift away from the war on terror formulation will encourage Pakistan to focus, de nouveau, on Kashmir. Pakistan, it is believed, will once again, through its proxies, the Taliban and allied or ancillary groups stir trouble in Kashmir. It will thus be square one again and the subcontinent will flare up. This line of thinking is fallacious and alarmist. Why?
The reasons are manifold. The most salient is that the regional as well as global equations have changed and Pakistan, the pivotal actor in these equations is in the midst of some change. It appears to be reorienting its foreign policy posture and orientation and seems to be opting for engagement instead of confrontation - both with the world (read the United States) , Afghanistan and India. This almost amounts to a paradigm shift. Historically, the Pakistani establishment is what Samuel Huntington called the praetorian oligarchic elite derived what may even be called its raison d'etre from hostility towards India, strategic depth in Afghanistan which meant propping up its proxies in Afghanistan and a very topsy-turvy relationship with the United States. (This relationship with the United States was never in the nature of an alliance but more or less an instrumental and transactional relationship).
Indicators of this change are the qualitative change in the tenor of relations with India reflected in improved trade relations with India, the easing of the visa regime, muting somewhat its vociferous stance on Kashmir and other such measures. The noise made at the United Nations over Kashmir is just noise and may be aimed at placating the Pakistani society which has been fed a staple diet of anti - India and Kashmir rhetoric. And continued infiltration of militants into Kashmir (very sparse levels) which goes against the ostensible drift of relations between India and Pakistan can be explained as a way of maintaining a degree of leverage over Kashmir. All in all, the indications are that there is a qualitative change afoot in the nature of Pakistan's polity, foreign policy and strategic orientation.
This change is predicated upon the global security environment and more importantly the structural conditions in Pakistan. The former has meant securitization of the war on terror formulation where states that use terrorism as a state policy stand marginalized and the latter, as is observed on a quotidian basis, has meant that the very forces that Pakistan used as foreign policy trump cards have turned against it. The country, it could be said, is at war with itself. Continuing with this would mean gloom and doom for Pakistan and if these forces are allowed leeway that Pakistan could split and fragment.
In combination these conditions – endogenous and exogenous – are forcing some sort of change in Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan is undergoing a review. Overlaying these conditions is the fact that the United States has learnt from its past mistakes and is not, contrary to speculation, disengaging from Pakistan. It sees Pakistan as a player that can degenerate into a spoiler state and given this is engaging with. These conditions, it is hoped, militate against a Pakistan which will act as a spoiler state and revert to its traditional stance of hostility towards India and stirring up trouble in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
It is in Pakistan's interest to have reasonably good relations with India and drop its strategic depth obsession in Afghanistan, and above all seek the approval and good will of the sole superpower, the United States. Pakistan cannot really afford to revert to its traditional stance.
Another important condition that needs to be factored here is the qualitative and quantitative change in the nature of the conflict in Kashmir. The conflict stands transformed. There is a vigorous political process in the place and the separatist spectrum not only stands marginalized but also disconnected from the people. This has implications for nuclear deterrence and conflict between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, under the shield of its nuclear weapons, created war like conditions which went under the name of the Kargil war. This cannot be repeated both because of the global and regional security and political conditions, the peace that obtains in Kashmir and the transformation of the conflict. Deterrence is holding well and the conflict has been managed and contained.
Cumulatively, all this means that it would mean almost suicide for Pakistan to revert to its traditional posture and stir trouble in Kashmir or Afghanistan. As long as there is a façade of a political process in Pakistan and its real power structure - the Army and the intelligence agencies - is in control of the security and foreign policy dynamic of the country and as long as Pakistan does not breakdown and extremists take power, there is little if no chance at all that Pakistan will resort to recrudescence. This means that the fears of the Indian security and defence establishment are overblown.
This , however, does not mean that vigilance be dropped or that the international community be smug and complacent. What it does mean that politics and diplomacy whether it be the nature of Pakistan's engagement with the world or the problems in Kashmir, be accorded primacy over narrow and parochial considerations. This has implications for Kashmir's internal security. An act that goes by the name of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act is in place. This act empowers, among other things, an ordinary soldier to kill on mere suspicion. Abuse of this act has led in the past to protests and anger. The justification for this act- vigorous insurgency- does not obtain in Kashmir. Recently, justification for the Act has been made on grounds of Pakistani recidivism after the United States exit from Afghanistan. However, as demonstrated here, this constitutes fallacious thinking.
The subcontinent may be on the cusp of a new security order. It becomes exigent that the equations and foundations underpinning this order be strengthened and nurtured. These can be consolidated and institutionalized with the primacy of diplomacy and politics over narrow and alarmist considerations and concerns. Global peace and security may well be contingent on this. Let peace be given a chance and let this be the goal of statecraft and statesmanship in the region.
The date for the drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan is approaching. This lead up to the exit is creating angst across the globe and in India in particular. It is believed that the withdrawl, whatever its reasons, will lead the extremist forces, inimical to peace and stability and proponents of global jihad to believe that they have emerged victorious. And that this will be an eerie echo of the end of the Cold War era, the ignonimous Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the United States estrangement from Pakistan.
This insalubrious development, it is held, will encourage the forces of recidivism and global jihad and will have serious implications on both regional and global security. In India, the security and defence establishment believes that the US exit from Afghanistan will relieve pressure on Pakistan and the United States drift away from the war on terror formulation will encourage Pakistan to focus, de nouveau, on Kashmir. Pakistan, it is believed, will once again, through its proxies, the Taliban and allied or ancillary groups stir trouble in Kashmir. It will thus be square one again and the subcontinent will flare up. This line of thinking is fallacious and alarmist. Why?
The reasons are manifold. The most salient is that the regional as well as global equations have changed and Pakistan, the pivotal actor in these equations is in the midst of some change. It appears to be reorienting its foreign policy posture and orientation and seems to be opting for engagement instead of confrontation - both with the world (read the United States) , Afghanistan and India. This almost amounts to a paradigm shift. Historically, the Pakistani establishment is what Samuel Huntington called the praetorian oligarchic elite derived what may even be called its raison d'etre from hostility towards India, strategic depth in Afghanistan which meant propping up its proxies in Afghanistan and a very topsy-turvy relationship with the United States. (This relationship with the United States was never in the nature of an alliance but more or less an instrumental and transactional relationship).
Indicators of this change are the qualitative change in the tenor of relations with India reflected in improved trade relations with India, the easing of the visa regime, muting somewhat its vociferous stance on Kashmir and other such measures. The noise made at the United Nations over Kashmir is just noise and may be aimed at placating the Pakistani society which has been fed a staple diet of anti - India and Kashmir rhetoric. And continued infiltration of militants into Kashmir (very sparse levels) which goes against the ostensible drift of relations between India and Pakistan can be explained as a way of maintaining a degree of leverage over Kashmir. All in all, the indications are that there is a qualitative change afoot in the nature of Pakistan's polity, foreign policy and strategic orientation.
This change is predicated upon the global security environment and more importantly the structural conditions in Pakistan. The former has meant securitization of the war on terror formulation where states that use terrorism as a state policy stand marginalized and the latter, as is observed on a quotidian basis, has meant that the very forces that Pakistan used as foreign policy trump cards have turned against it. The country, it could be said, is at war with itself. Continuing with this would mean gloom and doom for Pakistan and if these forces are allowed leeway that Pakistan could split and fragment.
In combination these conditions – endogenous and exogenous – are forcing some sort of change in Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan is undergoing a review. Overlaying these conditions is the fact that the United States has learnt from its past mistakes and is not, contrary to speculation, disengaging from Pakistan. It sees Pakistan as a player that can degenerate into a spoiler state and given this is engaging with. These conditions, it is hoped, militate against a Pakistan which will act as a spoiler state and revert to its traditional stance of hostility towards India and stirring up trouble in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
It is in Pakistan's interest to have reasonably good relations with India and drop its strategic depth obsession in Afghanistan, and above all seek the approval and good will of the sole superpower, the United States. Pakistan cannot really afford to revert to its traditional stance.
Another important condition that needs to be factored here is the qualitative and quantitative change in the nature of the conflict in Kashmir. The conflict stands transformed. There is a vigorous political process in the place and the separatist spectrum not only stands marginalized but also disconnected from the people. This has implications for nuclear deterrence and conflict between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, under the shield of its nuclear weapons, created war like conditions which went under the name of the Kargil war. This cannot be repeated both because of the global and regional security and political conditions, the peace that obtains in Kashmir and the transformation of the conflict. Deterrence is holding well and the conflict has been managed and contained.
Cumulatively, all this means that it would mean almost suicide for Pakistan to revert to its traditional posture and stir trouble in Kashmir or Afghanistan. As long as there is a façade of a political process in Pakistan and its real power structure - the Army and the intelligence agencies - is in control of the security and foreign policy dynamic of the country and as long as Pakistan does not breakdown and extremists take power, there is little if no chance at all that Pakistan will resort to recrudescence. This means that the fears of the Indian security and defence establishment are overblown.
This , however, does not mean that vigilance be dropped or that the international community be smug and complacent. What it does mean that politics and diplomacy whether it be the nature of Pakistan's engagement with the world or the problems in Kashmir, be accorded primacy over narrow and parochial considerations. This has implications for Kashmir's internal security. An act that goes by the name of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act is in place. This act empowers, among other things, an ordinary soldier to kill on mere suspicion. Abuse of this act has led in the past to protests and anger. The justification for this act- vigorous insurgency- does not obtain in Kashmir. Recently, justification for the Act has been made on grounds of Pakistani recidivism after the United States exit from Afghanistan. However, as demonstrated here, this constitutes fallacious thinking.
The subcontinent may be on the cusp of a new security order. It becomes exigent that the equations and foundations underpinning this order be strengthened and nurtured. These can be consolidated and institutionalized with the primacy of diplomacy and politics over narrow and alarmist considerations and concerns. Global peace and security may well be contingent on this. Let peace be given a chance and let this be the goal of statecraft and statesmanship in the region.
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