Can Pakistan resolve its existential crisis?
Wajahat Qazi Pakistan's contemporary condition - a state of anarchy and the possibility of drifting into a failed (or fragile) state - may best be characterized by a formulation referred to as an existential trilemma: severe domestic strife and anarchy, the possibility of balkanization or bantustanization, and last bit not the least, the loss of its sovereign status. This condition, it would appear accrues from the nature of its state-society relations, a melange of a torturous history, apparently unbridgeable ethnic cleavages, unresponsive mediatory state institutions, and the ideological glue that is supposed to accord coherence to Pakistan.
It is held that its foreign policy posture - whether it be its interest in Afghanistan or Kashmir accrues from these sets of conditions. What is in dispute or under contention is not the nature or merit of these assertions or contentions but the solution that is held to be the panacea for Pakistan's teeming troubles: the election of Asif Ali Zardari to the highest office of the country and the elevation of the party he 'inherited' by default, the Pakistan People's Party. We are told that this 'solution' would accord plenitude and closure to the beleaguered nation state. Validation for this assertion is provided or offered by organs of the United Sates' foreign policy apparatus, working, apparently at cross purposes and begetting a situation where organizational prestige and turf wars acquire precedence over the national interests of either Pakistan or the United States.This, in essence, and counter intuitively means or implies legitimizing the current drift in or of Pakistan’s politics: the politics of vendetta, revenge and humiliation. A clear cut instance of this is the 'plan' or 'program' that Zardari’s PPP as laid out for the 'revival' of Pakistan: populism (wheat subsidies that ultimately mean draining the exchequer and a prelude to queuing up at the twin sisters-World Bank and the IMF aimed to undercut Nawaz Sharrif's appeal in the Punjab, recourse to feudal (or medieval) politics to garner vote share in Baluchistan, and hitching Pakistan's wagon to the national security paradigms of the US or offering Pakistan's services to the United States on a platter without a genuine quid pro quo. Now the question(s) are: what is this strange set of these assumptions that, at best, present a temporary expedient and at worst a full circle for Pakistan predicated upon? And what is the confidence of my view premised upon? The answer to the former question, necessarily a speculative exercise, may lie in the nature of post September 11 Pakistan-US alliance politics, the US electoral cycle, the need for a recalibration of military-politico strategy in Afghanistan, and the inter turf conflict that defines or characterizes the various organs of the US' Foreign Policy establishment. And to former, I would posit or draw the attention to the nature of Pakistan's polity and its contemporary drift and or condition. Before venturing further, I would like to point out that this approach, that appears to be gaining traction and some legitimacy, both within and without Pakistan guarantees a full circle for Pakistan. That is, the lurch from one extreme to another, where the interregnum(s) and pauses are filled by ostensible representatives of the people, and inevitably followed by the 'intervention' of the armed forces to restore equilibrium. This 'recipe', needless to point out, may not be what Pakistan or the world or international community needs. Pakistan, in order to be a valuable and valued member of the international community and a proud and a confident post modern nation state needs the kind of course correction that it is genuine: one that comes from within and in the process genuine support and assurances by the international community is accorded to it. Now how can this be brought about? Or what kind of course correction (or review) would constitute a solution that rids Pakistan of its persistent malignancies?First and foremost, a review of the nature of Pakistan is warranted. Its identity needs to be firmly anchored and grounded in or under a framework or grid that redeems it in its own eyes. This may mean taking recourse to a nationalism that binds its various peoples under a common framework and subsumes the pulls and pressures that ethnic differences lead to. Second, is the urgent need to consolidate the remit of the Pakistani state and make or render its sovereignty real. Third would be to impart expansive citizenship rights to its people so that every Pakistani has or holds a stake in Pakistan. This 'prescription', of course, means improved and efficient governance. A follow up step would be to realign Pakistan's political economy and wed it to the global economy. Another reform that merits a review is its education system: the focus and thrust of the reform should be on imparting an expansive and eclectic education. A natural corollary, that effectives ties these together and brings them to fruition would perhaps be to rejig Pakistan’s political system and render it into a more effective unitary and centralized state- at least for the foreseeable future. Last but not the least, is the review of nature of its alliance with the wounded hegemon, the United States. Mutual cynicism, both on part of the US and Pakistan permeates alliance. This has to change. And this change is contingent on designing and articulating a grand strategy toward Pakistan that factors in the elements identified in this article and importantly not mean ignoring influential institutions of Pakistan: the Army and the ISI. Bringing them, on board or rendering them into genuine partners may be a prudent strategy or tactic. Otherwise it will be plus ca change, plus la meme thing with Pakistan performing a balancing act- either over Afghanistan or Kashmir, and the US venting out in ways that further alienate Pakistanis. Now the question: Can Zardari or the PPP pull it off? His past record, even after discounting or accounting for a born again Zardari does not offer much of a consolation. Neither, as we have seen, does his 'plan' or 'program'. It is here that the United States' role acquires salience: it (the US) for the sake of its national and security interests should discard expediency look harder and engage promising leaders and politicians among the younger cohort. That is, the kind who are not yet tainted by either bitterness or cynicism and have a vision for Pakistan. This may mean looking beyond the party system(s) or affiliations, culling the best and the brightest and engaging them. A clear cut delineation and implementation of the elements identified here may hopefully resolve Pakistan’s existential trilemma and enable it to reclaim honorable and legitimate space, the one articulated by its visionary founder for itslef in the post modern world and a dynamic, vibrant and plural Pakistan may come into being.
Wajahat Qazi Pakistan's contemporary condition - a state of anarchy and the possibility of drifting into a failed (or fragile) state - may best be characterized by a formulation referred to as an existential trilemma: severe domestic strife and anarchy, the possibility of balkanization or bantustanization, and last bit not the least, the loss of its sovereign status. This condition, it would appear accrues from the nature of its state-society relations, a melange of a torturous history, apparently unbridgeable ethnic cleavages, unresponsive mediatory state institutions, and the ideological glue that is supposed to accord coherence to Pakistan.
It is held that its foreign policy posture - whether it be its interest in Afghanistan or Kashmir accrues from these sets of conditions. What is in dispute or under contention is not the nature or merit of these assertions or contentions but the solution that is held to be the panacea for Pakistan's teeming troubles: the election of Asif Ali Zardari to the highest office of the country and the elevation of the party he 'inherited' by default, the Pakistan People's Party. We are told that this 'solution' would accord plenitude and closure to the beleaguered nation state. Validation for this assertion is provided or offered by organs of the United Sates' foreign policy apparatus, working, apparently at cross purposes and begetting a situation where organizational prestige and turf wars acquire precedence over the national interests of either Pakistan or the United States.This, in essence, and counter intuitively means or implies legitimizing the current drift in or of Pakistan’s politics: the politics of vendetta, revenge and humiliation. A clear cut instance of this is the 'plan' or 'program' that Zardari’s PPP as laid out for the 'revival' of Pakistan: populism (wheat subsidies that ultimately mean draining the exchequer and a prelude to queuing up at the twin sisters-World Bank and the IMF aimed to undercut Nawaz Sharrif's appeal in the Punjab, recourse to feudal (or medieval) politics to garner vote share in Baluchistan, and hitching Pakistan's wagon to the national security paradigms of the US or offering Pakistan's services to the United States on a platter without a genuine quid pro quo. Now the question(s) are: what is this strange set of these assumptions that, at best, present a temporary expedient and at worst a full circle for Pakistan predicated upon? And what is the confidence of my view premised upon? The answer to the former question, necessarily a speculative exercise, may lie in the nature of post September 11 Pakistan-US alliance politics, the US electoral cycle, the need for a recalibration of military-politico strategy in Afghanistan, and the inter turf conflict that defines or characterizes the various organs of the US' Foreign Policy establishment. And to former, I would posit or draw the attention to the nature of Pakistan's polity and its contemporary drift and or condition. Before venturing further, I would like to point out that this approach, that appears to be gaining traction and some legitimacy, both within and without Pakistan guarantees a full circle for Pakistan. That is, the lurch from one extreme to another, where the interregnum(s) and pauses are filled by ostensible representatives of the people, and inevitably followed by the 'intervention' of the armed forces to restore equilibrium. This 'recipe', needless to point out, may not be what Pakistan or the world or international community needs. Pakistan, in order to be a valuable and valued member of the international community and a proud and a confident post modern nation state needs the kind of course correction that it is genuine: one that comes from within and in the process genuine support and assurances by the international community is accorded to it. Now how can this be brought about? Or what kind of course correction (or review) would constitute a solution that rids Pakistan of its persistent malignancies?First and foremost, a review of the nature of Pakistan is warranted. Its identity needs to be firmly anchored and grounded in or under a framework or grid that redeems it in its own eyes. This may mean taking recourse to a nationalism that binds its various peoples under a common framework and subsumes the pulls and pressures that ethnic differences lead to. Second, is the urgent need to consolidate the remit of the Pakistani state and make or render its sovereignty real. Third would be to impart expansive citizenship rights to its people so that every Pakistani has or holds a stake in Pakistan. This 'prescription', of course, means improved and efficient governance. A follow up step would be to realign Pakistan's political economy and wed it to the global economy. Another reform that merits a review is its education system: the focus and thrust of the reform should be on imparting an expansive and eclectic education. A natural corollary, that effectives ties these together and brings them to fruition would perhaps be to rejig Pakistan’s political system and render it into a more effective unitary and centralized state- at least for the foreseeable future. Last but not the least, is the review of nature of its alliance with the wounded hegemon, the United States. Mutual cynicism, both on part of the US and Pakistan permeates alliance. This has to change. And this change is contingent on designing and articulating a grand strategy toward Pakistan that factors in the elements identified in this article and importantly not mean ignoring influential institutions of Pakistan: the Army and the ISI. Bringing them, on board or rendering them into genuine partners may be a prudent strategy or tactic. Otherwise it will be plus ca change, plus la meme thing with Pakistan performing a balancing act- either over Afghanistan or Kashmir, and the US venting out in ways that further alienate Pakistanis. Now the question: Can Zardari or the PPP pull it off? His past record, even after discounting or accounting for a born again Zardari does not offer much of a consolation. Neither, as we have seen, does his 'plan' or 'program'. It is here that the United States' role acquires salience: it (the US) for the sake of its national and security interests should discard expediency look harder and engage promising leaders and politicians among the younger cohort. That is, the kind who are not yet tainted by either bitterness or cynicism and have a vision for Pakistan. This may mean looking beyond the party system(s) or affiliations, culling the best and the brightest and engaging them. A clear cut delineation and implementation of the elements identified here may hopefully resolve Pakistan’s existential trilemma and enable it to reclaim honorable and legitimate space, the one articulated by its visionary founder for itslef in the post modern world and a dynamic, vibrant and plural Pakistan may come into being.
