Post Osama Blues: Reflections on the US Pakistani Relationship

Post Osama Assassination Blues: Reflections on the US Pakistani Relationship


A theme that cuts across Pakistan’s trajectory as an independent and a small nation state is its attempts to keep the west (or the United States) engaged. The means that it has chosen to do so have been to play up its geo strategic position and as a bulwark of Islam. During the Cold war, this entailed playing up the Cold war and being on the side of the west. Lately this has meant positioning itself as a ‘frontline ally against the ‘global war on terrorism. This posture has naturally entailed twists and turns and implied a ‘double game’ in the eyes of many in the west. Lent credence by the presence of Bin Laden in Pakistani territory allegedly shielded by a section of the power structure of Pakistan, this posture is now redounding against Pakistan. And it has serious implications for Pakistan’s relations with the United States.


What are the options available to the United States in ‘dealing’ with Pakistan? The gut and reflexive reaction following Bin Laden’s assassination would be to ‘punish’ Pakistan. Or in other words disavow relations with Pakistan and leave it in the lurch as punishment for playing a double game. While it may sate the emotional needs and revanchist or retributive impulses of many in the US, it, as a policy posture is rife with disaster. Pakistan can potentially retreat into itself and this condition given its nukes and geo strategic position can have negative fallouts in other dimensions. Pakistan, for instance, can play a spoiler in Afghanistan or even in Kashmir , where despite the success of the Indian Counter Insurgency, Pakistan still retains some clout and can, one, draw out the ‘peace process’ for as long as it can or, second, send its youth bulge to fight a Jihad against India. It is the author’s understanding that Pakistani restraint in not pushing armed irregulars into Indian Administered Kashmir is premised upon an understanding arrived with the United States after September 11 and the linkages of the issue with Afghanistan.


A ‘spoiler’ state in a dangerous and unstable neighborhood or what has been termed as the ‘arc of instability’ is not something that the United States or the west should bring about by a policy of either omission or commission. The stakes, to paraphrase the eminent Dr. Kissinger, are too high. Deserting it and leaving it to the vagaries of the neighborhood and to its own devices would be a disaster. It will, to repeat, retreat into itself and its fears about western ‘duplicity’ will be validated. And it will then naturally be either an obstructionist entity at odds with itself and the world or a spoiler state that throws a spanner into peace and stability in the neighborhood and perhaps even abroad. The latter may entail proliferation of nuclear weapons and exporting nuclear technology to an already volatile middle east where Iran appears to be on the verge of the nuclear break out option. And where other states may not trust the ‘extended deterrence’ offered by the United States and may seek nuclear weapons. A churlish and isolated Pakistan may be a willing partner to ‘help’ these states in their quest for nukes.

So what policy options or recourse does the United State have? Continued engagement with the country should be the policy mantra as well as premise. However, a caveat is in order here. Short termism should, at all costs, be avoided. The tenor of the new engagement with Pakistan should go beyond the ‘war on terrorism’ and the security needs of the United States and the west. It should be demonstrated to Pakistan it is a valued and a long term ally. And that its salubrious path would be, ipso facto, goof and salubrious for world order and given its nukes, for the international system as well. The engagement should go beyond aid and also focus on trade. The benefits of an open market economy and free trade should be extended to Pakistan and its political economy be gradually opened up and linked to the global economy. The focus of both the aid and trade should be the people of Pakistan and not its elite. As such, the thrust of this policy should be on human security or a combination of national and human security. The long term thrust of the policy should be to translate what has long been western rhetoric towards Pakistan- Pakistan’s transformation into a modern and democratic nation state-into reality. This can only happen through engagement and not dissociation. Pakistan is too important both strategically and in terms of humanity to be discarded and disengaged from. The onus lies on the United States to continue engagement with Pakistan.