Does it represent the need for a drastic repair of capitalism?
Wajahat Qazi A common denominator or theme underpins the lynching of a Gurgaon based executive of an MNC, the politicized protest against the takeover of land by the flagship Indian corporate brand, TATA, in the erstwhile bastion of Indian communism, West Bengal, the urban rural divide in China obfuscated and obscured by 'Chinese nationalism', or closer to the 'developed world', the neighbourhood- suburban divide, the fallout of the financial meltdown- a function of, at the risk of oversimplification, the breakdown between the risk return trade-off, the 'bail out', policy prescriptions under debate , foreclosures and of course other consequences.
This theme-identified and articulated by the eminent Dr. Kissinger - a testimony to his prescience and sagacity even though tinged with a degree of cynicism- at the tail end of the tumultuous decade (the nineties): an interlude that may be best described as an unearned holiday from history-stares us in the face: the marginalization of the dispossessed and the excluded from the 'gale' of 'free market' capitalism. This sweeping overview is of course open to questions and criticism. However, it raises a set of salient and germane questions that can be ignored only at the risk of disaster. Is the crisis (or meltdown) and its manifestations long festering, the tip of an iceberg? Does it represent or reflect the need for a drastic repair of capitalism? Was the seventies (early) induced 'retreat of the state' an aberrant interlude? Is the state (and the government) staging a comeback? Are we back to square one? Or full circle? Or are we witnessing a gale of 'creative destruction' the market nor correcting but purging itself of excesses? That is, notional finance? Is the current phase a prelude to the formation or crystallization of a hybrid identity or in other words the regulatory state? Or more broadly, is globalization or its nature itself undergoing a review? Are we witnessing the morphing of globalization into what the Economist has called globality? And if so, what are the implications and consequences? Answers to these sets of questions are beyond the scope of this article. However, I may or would like to tease out broad contours that may (hopefully) offer some amateur insights into the unfolding 'order'. First it would appear, if I may use the formulation (or coinage) of the best and brightest minds in finance, Professor Robert Schiller, the hype and hoopla surrounding the demise of the state and the 'triumph' of free market capitalism, and a new paradigm of development was an extended bout of irrational exuberance and that we are witnessing a correction of the disease. The salubrious aspect of this 'correction' appears the nature of globalization -as a process- sullied and defined by a certain paradigm appears to be undergoing a review on account of the pent up notional excesses. Hitherto the benefits of the economic aspects of globalization have been reaped or creamed off by the elite of countries opening up to the world or integrating into the global economy-be it India, China, the blighted Middle East, or even parts of Europe. (Trickle down economics , it may be germane to point out here, is a mere gloss or to use a metaphor or slur, lip stick on a pig , to justify or put a positive spin on the uneven distribution of wealth that opening up has involved or entailed). This, stripped of its essence may mean that regardless of the market fundamentalist view of globalization may have meant vulgar promotion of the market as the panacea to all ills , the state is needed and that the 'mini crises' identified in this article reflect to the tenacity and resilience of the state. I hasten to position myself on the middle, so to speak. That is to say, I am neither a market fundamentalist nor a die-hard fan of the state. Hence the nature of my view and perhaps a natural bias toward what I intuit is appearing on the horizon: a regulatory state. That is, roughly speaking, the kind of a state that is neither inhospitable to the market nor does it allow free rein. This, in turn ,means that the globalization paradigm forced upon the throats of governments and states regardless of its flawed nature, paradoxically, should not (and in fact cannot be) be jettisoned. And that a renewed thrust on shaping the process and rendering it more humane or responsive to the needs of its most important constituency, the people is warranted. This, more specifically may mean, redesigning the architecture of global governance-reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, and involving or redesigning the nature of public private partnerships, where a multitude of stakeholders become partners to the developmental process. And of course, last but not the least, the continued involvement of the wounded hegemon in the affairs of the world. This obviously has implications for the nature and form of world order. A hands off involvement, apparently or evidently, oxymoronic, may be the best we may hope from the sole superpower. Or in other words, the kind that has been identified by some scholars as 'loose multipolarity' or even better by the historian of historians (contenporary), Niall Ferguson, as apolarity. A combination of these or a concerted attempt to bring these conditions to pass, incidentally or paradoxically, again with the assistance of the United States may bring about a semblance of world order where the entire world becomes a stakeholder in forging a better, prosperous and peaceful world. Or in other worlds globalization morphs into globality: a world order not defined by a 'race to the bottom' but by meritocracy and the kind of competition where nationality, nationalism and ideology becomes infructous.
Wajahat Qazi A common denominator or theme underpins the lynching of a Gurgaon based executive of an MNC, the politicized protest against the takeover of land by the flagship Indian corporate brand, TATA, in the erstwhile bastion of Indian communism, West Bengal, the urban rural divide in China obfuscated and obscured by 'Chinese nationalism', or closer to the 'developed world', the neighbourhood- suburban divide, the fallout of the financial meltdown- a function of, at the risk of oversimplification, the breakdown between the risk return trade-off, the 'bail out', policy prescriptions under debate , foreclosures and of course other consequences.
This theme-identified and articulated by the eminent Dr. Kissinger - a testimony to his prescience and sagacity even though tinged with a degree of cynicism- at the tail end of the tumultuous decade (the nineties): an interlude that may be best described as an unearned holiday from history-stares us in the face: the marginalization of the dispossessed and the excluded from the 'gale' of 'free market' capitalism. This sweeping overview is of course open to questions and criticism. However, it raises a set of salient and germane questions that can be ignored only at the risk of disaster. Is the crisis (or meltdown) and its manifestations long festering, the tip of an iceberg? Does it represent or reflect the need for a drastic repair of capitalism? Was the seventies (early) induced 'retreat of the state' an aberrant interlude? Is the state (and the government) staging a comeback? Are we back to square one? Or full circle? Or are we witnessing a gale of 'creative destruction' the market nor correcting but purging itself of excesses? That is, notional finance? Is the current phase a prelude to the formation or crystallization of a hybrid identity or in other words the regulatory state? Or more broadly, is globalization or its nature itself undergoing a review? Are we witnessing the morphing of globalization into what the Economist has called globality? And if so, what are the implications and consequences? Answers to these sets of questions are beyond the scope of this article. However, I may or would like to tease out broad contours that may (hopefully) offer some amateur insights into the unfolding 'order'. First it would appear, if I may use the formulation (or coinage) of the best and brightest minds in finance, Professor Robert Schiller, the hype and hoopla surrounding the demise of the state and the 'triumph' of free market capitalism, and a new paradigm of development was an extended bout of irrational exuberance and that we are witnessing a correction of the disease. The salubrious aspect of this 'correction' appears the nature of globalization -as a process- sullied and defined by a certain paradigm appears to be undergoing a review on account of the pent up notional excesses. Hitherto the benefits of the economic aspects of globalization have been reaped or creamed off by the elite of countries opening up to the world or integrating into the global economy-be it India, China, the blighted Middle East, or even parts of Europe. (Trickle down economics , it may be germane to point out here, is a mere gloss or to use a metaphor or slur, lip stick on a pig , to justify or put a positive spin on the uneven distribution of wealth that opening up has involved or entailed). This, stripped of its essence may mean that regardless of the market fundamentalist view of globalization may have meant vulgar promotion of the market as the panacea to all ills , the state is needed and that the 'mini crises' identified in this article reflect to the tenacity and resilience of the state. I hasten to position myself on the middle, so to speak. That is to say, I am neither a market fundamentalist nor a die-hard fan of the state. Hence the nature of my view and perhaps a natural bias toward what I intuit is appearing on the horizon: a regulatory state. That is, roughly speaking, the kind of a state that is neither inhospitable to the market nor does it allow free rein. This, in turn ,means that the globalization paradigm forced upon the throats of governments and states regardless of its flawed nature, paradoxically, should not (and in fact cannot be) be jettisoned. And that a renewed thrust on shaping the process and rendering it more humane or responsive to the needs of its most important constituency, the people is warranted. This, more specifically may mean, redesigning the architecture of global governance-reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, and involving or redesigning the nature of public private partnerships, where a multitude of stakeholders become partners to the developmental process. And of course, last but not the least, the continued involvement of the wounded hegemon in the affairs of the world. This obviously has implications for the nature and form of world order. A hands off involvement, apparently or evidently, oxymoronic, may be the best we may hope from the sole superpower. Or in other words, the kind that has been identified by some scholars as 'loose multipolarity' or even better by the historian of historians (contenporary), Niall Ferguson, as apolarity. A combination of these or a concerted attempt to bring these conditions to pass, incidentally or paradoxically, again with the assistance of the United States may bring about a semblance of world order where the entire world becomes a stakeholder in forging a better, prosperous and peaceful world. Or in other worlds globalization morphs into globality: a world order not defined by a 'race to the bottom' but by meritocracy and the kind of competition where nationality, nationalism and ideology becomes infructous.
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