The obvious conclusion to draw from the US ambassador, Timothy Roemer’s visit to Kashmir and choosing to meet its elected representative, Omar Abdullah, and snub the entire spectrum of the separatist leadership is that the United States, through the prestige of the Ambassador’s office, is lending its weight onto Greater Autonomy for Kashmir. This sensible approach accrues, at a macro level, from the overall and broader situation in the region-Pakistan’s inexorable drift into quasi anarchy and a fragile state, the structural problems of Afghanistan and the attendant implications and spillover for Kashmir or the inverse. It also means explicit recognition of the fact that ethno nationalism in this day and age is passé and the formation of new micro states premised on ethno nationalism is a non starter and that the international system cannot bear the burden of new states especially after the drift of some decolonized states into state failure. And that disputes arising from ethnic mismatches and incongruent borders that went under the rubric of self determination are better resolved within the state paradigm. While this realism may go against the principle of self determination articulated by Wilson, it is, in this day age, perhaps the only antidote to problems engendered by ethno nationalism and the self determination conundrum or paradox.
Insofar Kashmir is concerned and at a micro level the Greater Autonomy plank or stance has been held by the ruling party, the National Conference since its inception and more poignantly since its towering leader, the late Shaikh Abdullah, entered into an Accord over Kashmir with the Government of India, in 1975. Resisted by powers that be in the Centre, greater autonomy also came to be sidelined during the heyday of insurgency in Kashmir. The separatist leadership would settle for nothing less than maximalist demands-secession from the Indian union freedom for Kashmir which was , at least for a substantial chunk of the separatists a Trojan horse for eventual merger with Pakistan. However, gradually and inexorably, on account of attrition, the changed extraneous political environment after September 11 and the structural problems that Pakistan faced, the insurgency could not be sustained and it gradually ebbed. Followed by a lull and an interlude of relative calm, the people of Kashmir, in a sense, fed up with political impasse and gridlock, took to the streets and rearticulated their grievances against the Indian state in the idiom of freedom. This maximalist demand obscured the real problems, that is , a political gridlock and foot dragging by the Government of India over resolving the Kashmir problem for good and its preference for a precarious status quo where the GoI took the defeat of the insurgency by the Indian state as validation for its approach towards Kashmir. The result was that the street became the theater of politics where the alienated youth bulge of Kashmir spewed their rage and angst at the Indian state, de nouveau. So in a sense, the situation in Kashmir reverted to square one in terms of the alienation of people and their demands. This is the micro backdrop to the Roemer visit and the US preference for greater autonomy for Kashmir- a sane and the only practical solution to the vexed problems
Now the question is what impediments could the greater autonomy paradigm or formulation face in India and second what would it mean in practice for Kashmiris? The resistance to greater autonomy is more likely than not to come from the Hindu Right smitten by the Hindutva bug. The Hindu Right in the past has tried to make political mileage from the special status bestowed to Kashmir, Article 370 of the Indian constitution and ,by twisting and putting a spin on it, has presented it to the people of India as a blot on India and accused its proponents of pandering to the minorities and ‘pseudo secularism’. However, real issue is larger than this one. Greater Autonomy for Kashmir is about the Idea of India: the idea that Nehru had in mind and the one that is making the world notice India: its deeply entrenched secularism and liberal democratic nature. Greater autonomy for Kashmir, in effect, validates this Idea of India: a confident, vibrant and plural India at peace with itself and not squeamish about its sovereignty. It is about an India that nurtures and respects its minorities and places them at a pedestal that in the final scheme of things can only enrich India. Au contraire, the alternative idea of India put forth by the Hindu Right and its schemes for Kashmir only negate this idea of India and condemns India to what is essentially alien to it: regression, distrust, and a monofocal view of India. It is to the former idea of India that the powers that be in India should revert to and crystallize and Greater autonomy in this schema becomes central to it. One implication pregnant and rife with positive consequences is that this idea of India makes Kashmir the part of India on account of soft power and not the hard variety: an approach that is in the final analysis help India achieve what it has hitherto failed in: winning the hearts and minds of Kashmiri’s for good.
What would this autonomy mean in practice for Kashmiri’s? It should, first mean an expansive identity that does not need the abstract state to fructify and reach efflorescence and second, it should mean real and significant empowerment of all Kashmiri’s. This can only happen when the terrain of the struggle shifts on the domain of rights and entitlements-political, economic and social. Rendering tangible these sets of rights should, in the final analysis, render Kashmiri’s empowered and confident and this can only happen if flesh and substance is accorded to Greater Autonomy for Kashmir and it is not merely a shift in nomenclature and a glorified name for the same old politics. In today’s globalized world, where the state, while remaining the basic unit of politics, has however in some areas transformed itself and shed its queasiness and squeamishness about some attributes of sovereignty , devolving chunks of power to constituent states just means being aligned with significant global trends and not going against their gravamen. And it should, for a state like India, which has positioned itself in the arterial system of globalization not be difficult. In a rather counterintuitive way, Greater Autonomy for Kashmir also means validation of being a Great Power-an aspiration that India holds. Rightfully. The US ambassador’s visit is confirmation of the factors enumerated in this article. So for a better future for all , peace within and without, let us make haste slowly and grasp the opportunity
Monday, March 21, 2011
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
To Egypt, With Love
The neo conservative –the ideology or worldview that the Bush Administration after the Sep 11 terror attacks heartily professed and espoused-assessment and analysis of the ills that plague the Arab Islamic world have a striking resonance in the protest movement gripping the very important state of Egypt. Briefly, neo conservatives attributed the ills of the region largely to the authoritarian nature of governance and the striking absence of democracy and freedom in much of the Middle East. And, perhaps more importantly and significantly, they held that freedom was the fundamental aspiration and longing of every human being or that it-the idea of freedom-was and is universal. Nothing more validates the neo con assessment, to repeat, at the risk of sounding tautological, than the rumblings of change or the protest movement directed against the power structure put in place by the ageing gerontocrat and autocrat, Hosni Mubarak and his power clique, and perhaps inspired by the bottoms up change in Tunisia. While it is too soon to call the protest movement a revolution, it is, given the cunning that Arab autocrats have held and clung to power in the Middle East and the strategic position that Egypt holds, incredibly difficult to prognosticate on the implications and significance of the movement on the power dynamic of the Arab Muslim Middle East. Having said this, the protest movement is, however, an ode to the idea that determines history: the idea of freedom and its concomitant democracy. The protest movements, originating in Tunisia, also point out to the ‘potential return of ‘siyasah’(politics)-hitherto monopolized by the autocrats and the dreaded mukhabaraat(intelligence services) in the region and more broadly, to borrow a phrase,’ the return of history’ in the region.
The protest movement may unfortunately die, on account of fatigue and the remarkable staying power of established power structures in Egypt, who may take recourse to cosmetic change to keep their grip on power. However, it, on the positive side inaugurates the idea of freedom and democracy in the Arab Muslim world and the deep yearning for it by the ‘hoi polloi’, in the process not only validating the idea of either as universal but also discrediting the bleak image and picture painted by the Orientalists of the Arab Muslim world as being gripped by past notions of glory and stuck in that. The inference that the Orientalist’s and their neo Orientalist scribblers want us to draw is that authoritarianism is inherent to the Arab Muslim world, the ‘Arab street’ is inert, and dances to the tune of power thereby deflecting anger onto Israel, and that given the reactionary attitude and torpor induced by the loss of imperium, that has gripped the collective unconscious of the Arab Muslim world, the only idiom that the Arab Muslim world can engage with the world is terrorism- a point of view , unfortunately lent credence by the sordid saga of September 11. Now this notion stands discredited as the desire and yearning for freedom by the Arab street is on vivid and eloquent display. This may be the most significant message that is sent out or relayed by the protests.
Now after having laid out the ‘abstracts’, I would venture on the domain of amateur punditry by first touching on the potential fallout of the protests and then offering or attempting to offer some prescriptions for the policy making elite of the power that matters and will continue to do so for the indefinite future and whose bearing and orientation toward the protests will have enduring significance: the United States. It stands to reason, to repeat myself, that the staying power of the Egyptian regime is immense and that while the protests may rattle it and the power structure put in place, we may not witness long term and lasting change in Egypt. The only fallout or significant fallout that I see panning out is a bit of the ‘shuffling of cards’ to impart an illusion of change to the regime and its politics. This may take the form of changing electoral rules of conduct and allowing hitherto marginalized and excluded political forces and giving them a wee bit of voice.(El Baradei and his cohort and perhaps the more moderate wing of the Islamic Brotherhood spring to mind here).Some economic changes –tinkering with subsidies and inflation- that take care of the prosaic and mundane needs of the people may also be taken recourse to. Beyond this I see no significant change to the tenor, style and method of politics in Egypt. Having said this, it would be naïve to not see the protests as harbinger of real change in the future. A crack in the power edifice has appeared , the door for political and then economic change is ajar and it would be a travesty if this is not further exploited. This is where the role and orientation of the wounded hegemon, the United States, becomes pertinent. It would be prudent for the United States to adopt a ‘wait and watch’ approach, review its traditional assumptions about the Arab Middle East, and then carefully and delicately encourage forces of change in the region. The reviewed approach may have tangential (but much needed) impact on US diplomacy and the nature of its engagement with the Arab Muslim world. Hitherto held in thrall by the needs of the Cold War and flawed representation of both Islam and the Arabs, the United States, it could be fairly said, has not really figured out the Arab Islamic world and much of its foreign policy rested on flawed constructs. These constructs-lent salience and validated on the Arab Muslim side, by the regimes and mullah’s usurping the power of representation- have, I daresay ,contributed to much bad blood between the United States and the Arab Muslim world.(Sep 11 was but one ghastly and gory reminder of this bad blood). A prudent, careful and farsighted approach toward the Middle East may thus have ramifications and implications for both world order and peace. Much, depends on the United States. We all hope and pray that the wounded hegemon stays engaged, sees the protests as a cry for change, rise to the occasion and stay true to its creed. This , in the final analysis is what we all expect from the United States and world peace and order may ultimately depend upon it.
The protest movement may unfortunately die, on account of fatigue and the remarkable staying power of established power structures in Egypt, who may take recourse to cosmetic change to keep their grip on power. However, it, on the positive side inaugurates the idea of freedom and democracy in the Arab Muslim world and the deep yearning for it by the ‘hoi polloi’, in the process not only validating the idea of either as universal but also discrediting the bleak image and picture painted by the Orientalists of the Arab Muslim world as being gripped by past notions of glory and stuck in that. The inference that the Orientalist’s and their neo Orientalist scribblers want us to draw is that authoritarianism is inherent to the Arab Muslim world, the ‘Arab street’ is inert, and dances to the tune of power thereby deflecting anger onto Israel, and that given the reactionary attitude and torpor induced by the loss of imperium, that has gripped the collective unconscious of the Arab Muslim world, the only idiom that the Arab Muslim world can engage with the world is terrorism- a point of view , unfortunately lent credence by the sordid saga of September 11. Now this notion stands discredited as the desire and yearning for freedom by the Arab street is on vivid and eloquent display. This may be the most significant message that is sent out or relayed by the protests.
Now after having laid out the ‘abstracts’, I would venture on the domain of amateur punditry by first touching on the potential fallout of the protests and then offering or attempting to offer some prescriptions for the policy making elite of the power that matters and will continue to do so for the indefinite future and whose bearing and orientation toward the protests will have enduring significance: the United States. It stands to reason, to repeat myself, that the staying power of the Egyptian regime is immense and that while the protests may rattle it and the power structure put in place, we may not witness long term and lasting change in Egypt. The only fallout or significant fallout that I see panning out is a bit of the ‘shuffling of cards’ to impart an illusion of change to the regime and its politics. This may take the form of changing electoral rules of conduct and allowing hitherto marginalized and excluded political forces and giving them a wee bit of voice.(El Baradei and his cohort and perhaps the more moderate wing of the Islamic Brotherhood spring to mind here).Some economic changes –tinkering with subsidies and inflation- that take care of the prosaic and mundane needs of the people may also be taken recourse to. Beyond this I see no significant change to the tenor, style and method of politics in Egypt. Having said this, it would be naïve to not see the protests as harbinger of real change in the future. A crack in the power edifice has appeared , the door for political and then economic change is ajar and it would be a travesty if this is not further exploited. This is where the role and orientation of the wounded hegemon, the United States, becomes pertinent. It would be prudent for the United States to adopt a ‘wait and watch’ approach, review its traditional assumptions about the Arab Middle East, and then carefully and delicately encourage forces of change in the region. The reviewed approach may have tangential (but much needed) impact on US diplomacy and the nature of its engagement with the Arab Muslim world. Hitherto held in thrall by the needs of the Cold War and flawed representation of both Islam and the Arabs, the United States, it could be fairly said, has not really figured out the Arab Islamic world and much of its foreign policy rested on flawed constructs. These constructs-lent salience and validated on the Arab Muslim side, by the regimes and mullah’s usurping the power of representation- have, I daresay ,contributed to much bad blood between the United States and the Arab Muslim world.(Sep 11 was but one ghastly and gory reminder of this bad blood). A prudent, careful and farsighted approach toward the Middle East may thus have ramifications and implications for both world order and peace. Much, depends on the United States. We all hope and pray that the wounded hegemon stays engaged, sees the protests as a cry for change, rise to the occasion and stay true to its creed. This , in the final analysis is what we all expect from the United States and world peace and order may ultimately depend upon it.
On Globalized Islam
Globalized Islam is a fact and a ‘fixture’ in most western societies now. Delinked from culture, and deterritorialized, it presents both an opportunity as well as a threat to both western societies and itself. The former because shorn of the influence of the mullahs whose esoteric scholarship and the endless world of fatwa’s disconnected from modern reality has ossified the Islamic traditions which are badly in need of reform, the prospects of Ijtehad(or enlightened reasoning) can perhaps only take place in the west. The latter because alienation or what David Cameron has aptly called ‘rootlessness’ can lead to a security as well as a social problem for western societies and also globalized Islam has the potential of transmogrifying or mutating Islam into an unrecognizable ideology in spite of the reassurances held out by the eminent Scholar Olivier Roy that globalized Islam will ultimately and inexorably go the way of Reform Judaism. This is rendered poignant and salient by the question of,’ Who Speaks for Muslims or Islam? Is it the imported mullah’s or mufti’s who can only speak in the idiom of madressah’s? Or modernist intellectuals who have made a name for themselves in their host societies but are estranged from fellow Muslims on account of either acculturation or other reasons?
Both, to repeat myself, I am afraid to say, pose insuperable problems or dilemmas for western societies and governments and Islam itself. The focus on the mullahs or imported imams, while comforting for Muslims in host societies, in terms of validation of Islamic principles for their progeny and ensuring continuity in some form of the Islamic traditions in the private sphere is a non starter. Non starter because the needs of globalized Islam are different: born and raised in western milieus, young Muslims need role models who can relate to them. It stretches reason to believe that, say a Pakistani imam trained (or schooled) only in the Deobandi tradition can relate to young Muslims in the west save perhaps the freshly arrived. Inherent in this approach also is the perpetuation of some odious accretions that Islam can do better without. The other option of modernist intellectuals begets problems too largely because these intellectuals speak from a perch that is disconnected from the reality of most Muslims in the west. Fluent in the idiom of host societies, some kind of schizophrenia- success in host societies comingled with a sense of estrangement from fellow Muslims whose problems they allegedly articulate or address- defines or marks these urbane and sophisticated intellectuals. This in a way replicates or is a microcosm of the problem of modernity or the trajectory of modernity in the Islamic worlds where the elite, schooled in the idiom of secular modernity were increasingly estranged from their constituents leading to sclerotic and warped forms of nationalism and secularism in the Arab Islamic worlds. This, in turn, created space for Islamist movements to thrive only to be repressed by the authoritarian states of the Arab Islamic world. In the west, what may happen is, that the ground may be ceded to movements like the Tableeghi Jamaat, whose monofocal emphasis on the five pillars of Islam and activism to make ‘good Muslims’ by focusing on the time of the Prophet (SAW) and mimicking the conditions of the early Muslims may be the only option available to young Muslims in the west. Or in a more extreme rendition, the field may become open for more radical imams or people espousing more radical views. So the question is what can be done or what methods can be employed to render the trajectory of globalized Islam smooth and salubrious?
The solution I would posit is that western governments, first and foremost accept that religion is here to stay in the west and that it is a need for those for whom it is the most significant and meaningful aspect of their lives and second instead of retreating from multiculturalism, which is the latest fashion these days actively, rejig existing institutional arrangements and enter into a partnership with sober and well meaning Muslim leaders. The nature of this partnership should not be along the lines of a quid pro quo but a genuine desire to integrate Islam into western societies on terms that are mutually beneficial. More specifically, this would mean or entail, traineeships for young imams who are schooled both in the western tradition as well as the Islamic one with excellent communication and leadership skills. The kind that would enable them to speak to the conditions of Muslims in the west in an idiom that they understand and more importantly educate young Muslims in the civic virtues of liberal societies and the responsibilities that this entails. Overlaying this may be an emphasis on Sufism or spiritual aspects of Islam which addresses the spiritual needs of Muslims. While this is no foolproof method that guarantees integration of Islam in the west, it may carry some insights that if applied may lead to peace within and without.
Both, to repeat myself, I am afraid to say, pose insuperable problems or dilemmas for western societies and governments and Islam itself. The focus on the mullahs or imported imams, while comforting for Muslims in host societies, in terms of validation of Islamic principles for their progeny and ensuring continuity in some form of the Islamic traditions in the private sphere is a non starter. Non starter because the needs of globalized Islam are different: born and raised in western milieus, young Muslims need role models who can relate to them. It stretches reason to believe that, say a Pakistani imam trained (or schooled) only in the Deobandi tradition can relate to young Muslims in the west save perhaps the freshly arrived. Inherent in this approach also is the perpetuation of some odious accretions that Islam can do better without. The other option of modernist intellectuals begets problems too largely because these intellectuals speak from a perch that is disconnected from the reality of most Muslims in the west. Fluent in the idiom of host societies, some kind of schizophrenia- success in host societies comingled with a sense of estrangement from fellow Muslims whose problems they allegedly articulate or address- defines or marks these urbane and sophisticated intellectuals. This in a way replicates or is a microcosm of the problem of modernity or the trajectory of modernity in the Islamic worlds where the elite, schooled in the idiom of secular modernity were increasingly estranged from their constituents leading to sclerotic and warped forms of nationalism and secularism in the Arab Islamic worlds. This, in turn, created space for Islamist movements to thrive only to be repressed by the authoritarian states of the Arab Islamic world. In the west, what may happen is, that the ground may be ceded to movements like the Tableeghi Jamaat, whose monofocal emphasis on the five pillars of Islam and activism to make ‘good Muslims’ by focusing on the time of the Prophet (SAW) and mimicking the conditions of the early Muslims may be the only option available to young Muslims in the west. Or in a more extreme rendition, the field may become open for more radical imams or people espousing more radical views. So the question is what can be done or what methods can be employed to render the trajectory of globalized Islam smooth and salubrious?
The solution I would posit is that western governments, first and foremost accept that religion is here to stay in the west and that it is a need for those for whom it is the most significant and meaningful aspect of their lives and second instead of retreating from multiculturalism, which is the latest fashion these days actively, rejig existing institutional arrangements and enter into a partnership with sober and well meaning Muslim leaders. The nature of this partnership should not be along the lines of a quid pro quo but a genuine desire to integrate Islam into western societies on terms that are mutually beneficial. More specifically, this would mean or entail, traineeships for young imams who are schooled both in the western tradition as well as the Islamic one with excellent communication and leadership skills. The kind that would enable them to speak to the conditions of Muslims in the west in an idiom that they understand and more importantly educate young Muslims in the civic virtues of liberal societies and the responsibilities that this entails. Overlaying this may be an emphasis on Sufism or spiritual aspects of Islam which addresses the spiritual needs of Muslims. While this is no foolproof method that guarantees integration of Islam in the west, it may carry some insights that if applied may lead to peace within and without.
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Musings on the Death of Multiculturalism in the West
Musings on the Death of Multiculturalism in the West
David Cameron’s public statement’s on the nature of ills plaguing Muslim Britain and hence the broader society and polity echo Angela Merkel’s disdain and resigned comments on multiculturalism in Germany. It would, however, be a mistake to see a parallel between Britain and Germany. Britain-proud heir to or perhaps even pioneer of multiculturalism – clearly departs from the condition of Germany where it was the policy problem or conundrum raised by the gastarbeiter(or guest workers) overlain perhaps by the problems engendered by the deepening and widening of the European Union and the structural forces of globalization catalyzed the problem rendering it in the process into a social problem. It would thus, to repeat, be a mistake to view the entire multicultural enterprise as being flawed and introduce an alternate policy straitjacket or paradigm that goes against the gravamen of diversity and pluralism. Having said this, it is about time that some of the assumptions undergirding multiculturalism and its policy implications are due for a comprehensive review.
The consensus or the evolving consensus in the west about the ills or pitfalls of multiculturalism stem largely from the failure of state encouraged or more accurately state patronized multiculturalism to inculcate the ‘we’ feeling among Muslims who have chosen to live or who for other reasons-persecution, refugees fleeing from failed states-find themselves in the west. Or in other words, state patronized multiculturalism has failed to make citizens out of Muslims in the west. This state of affairs, alarming as it is for intrinsic reasons, it must be pointed out, does not accrue from Islam or the nature of the Islamic faith. The failure lies in the lackadaisical approach towards the presence and existence of Muslims living in western societies and in the final analysis is an educational failure. By educational failure is meant that the nature of open societies, the rights, duties and responsibilities accruing from living in open societies has not been adequately explained to Muslims in the west. Having said this, I am not for one moment suggesting that western societies owe Muslims an explanation but it, for reasons of prudence and sagacity, it would have been better, if the nature of liberalism and open societies would have been made clear to Muslims in an idiom that would be understood by them.
It would be a travesty if the entire project or enterprise of multiculturalism were to be abandoned because implicit in aspects of multiculturalism is a renewed or a fresh relationship between Islam and the West. Hitherto articulated in the idiom of and colored by colonialism and the colonial legacy and, of course, the historical memory of the crusades, the contemporary encounter between Islam and the west mediated by globalization, offers a meeting point which can potentially be frictionless, from a long duree point of view. And the good thing is that it can be a good for Muslims and by extension the host societies. Good because some of the accretions that have been built upon the Islamic tradition, on account of vested interests and power of the mullahs, and that have stubbornly persisted, may be given short shrift by the contemporary encounter. Or in other words, reform of some of Islamic traditions, long overdue, and resisted by the corpus of mullahs and their patrons, within the Islamic world may actually happen in the west or on account of Islam’s contemporary encounter with the west. The doors of Ijtihad (roughly meaning, independent and enlightened reasoning), frowned upon by the extremists and fanatics may actually be opened in the west- the ancillary benefit of liberalism and the liberal tradition.
An added advantage may be that the virtues of toleration and respect for diversity- virtues that the Quran respects and enjoins- become a reflex among Muslims living in the west. Long used to living in mono cultural societies, some Muslims have, unfortunately lost this virtue and in some cases or instances may even aggressively pursue a majoritarian agenda.(Taliban ruled Afghanistan springs to mind here).Appreciation of diversity, tolerance and toleration, the ability to countenance diverse points of view may accrue only in multi cultural and liberal societies and continuing with the legacy of multiculturalism albeit in a new and reviewed form. In our globalized world, with diasporic movements across cultures, these enlightened Muslims can represent the west as it is than the warped images which reduce the west to a crude caricature. This new model of multiculturalism may take as its starting point the kind of integration which, one assuages Muslims fears, that living in the west does not mean or necessarily entail loss of faith, and second also lays the onus of integrating with the broader society on both Muslims themselves and members of the broader societies too. In other others, review the model of citizenship by rendering it into an active model and allow the impetus of integration come from within by demonstrating the soft power of liberal societies. The alternative-extreme models of assimilation –may send a wrong message to Muslims both within and without. A message that validates the fears of some Muslims that the west is out on an all out assault on Islam and renders the passive majority of Muslims if not open to the suasions of extremists but certainly sympathetic to them. This is a message that does not need to be sent out at this delicate moment of tension between the Islamic worlds and the west. So Mr. Cameron, a review but not a jettisoning of the multiculturalism paradigm is called for.
David Cameron’s public statement’s on the nature of ills plaguing Muslim Britain and hence the broader society and polity echo Angela Merkel’s disdain and resigned comments on multiculturalism in Germany. It would, however, be a mistake to see a parallel between Britain and Germany. Britain-proud heir to or perhaps even pioneer of multiculturalism – clearly departs from the condition of Germany where it was the policy problem or conundrum raised by the gastarbeiter(or guest workers) overlain perhaps by the problems engendered by the deepening and widening of the European Union and the structural forces of globalization catalyzed the problem rendering it in the process into a social problem. It would thus, to repeat, be a mistake to view the entire multicultural enterprise as being flawed and introduce an alternate policy straitjacket or paradigm that goes against the gravamen of diversity and pluralism. Having said this, it is about time that some of the assumptions undergirding multiculturalism and its policy implications are due for a comprehensive review.
The consensus or the evolving consensus in the west about the ills or pitfalls of multiculturalism stem largely from the failure of state encouraged or more accurately state patronized multiculturalism to inculcate the ‘we’ feeling among Muslims who have chosen to live or who for other reasons-persecution, refugees fleeing from failed states-find themselves in the west. Or in other words, state patronized multiculturalism has failed to make citizens out of Muslims in the west. This state of affairs, alarming as it is for intrinsic reasons, it must be pointed out, does not accrue from Islam or the nature of the Islamic faith. The failure lies in the lackadaisical approach towards the presence and existence of Muslims living in western societies and in the final analysis is an educational failure. By educational failure is meant that the nature of open societies, the rights, duties and responsibilities accruing from living in open societies has not been adequately explained to Muslims in the west. Having said this, I am not for one moment suggesting that western societies owe Muslims an explanation but it, for reasons of prudence and sagacity, it would have been better, if the nature of liberalism and open societies would have been made clear to Muslims in an idiom that would be understood by them.
It would be a travesty if the entire project or enterprise of multiculturalism were to be abandoned because implicit in aspects of multiculturalism is a renewed or a fresh relationship between Islam and the West. Hitherto articulated in the idiom of and colored by colonialism and the colonial legacy and, of course, the historical memory of the crusades, the contemporary encounter between Islam and the west mediated by globalization, offers a meeting point which can potentially be frictionless, from a long duree point of view. And the good thing is that it can be a good for Muslims and by extension the host societies. Good because some of the accretions that have been built upon the Islamic tradition, on account of vested interests and power of the mullahs, and that have stubbornly persisted, may be given short shrift by the contemporary encounter. Or in other words, reform of some of Islamic traditions, long overdue, and resisted by the corpus of mullahs and their patrons, within the Islamic world may actually happen in the west or on account of Islam’s contemporary encounter with the west. The doors of Ijtihad (roughly meaning, independent and enlightened reasoning), frowned upon by the extremists and fanatics may actually be opened in the west- the ancillary benefit of liberalism and the liberal tradition.
An added advantage may be that the virtues of toleration and respect for diversity- virtues that the Quran respects and enjoins- become a reflex among Muslims living in the west. Long used to living in mono cultural societies, some Muslims have, unfortunately lost this virtue and in some cases or instances may even aggressively pursue a majoritarian agenda.(Taliban ruled Afghanistan springs to mind here).Appreciation of diversity, tolerance and toleration, the ability to countenance diverse points of view may accrue only in multi cultural and liberal societies and continuing with the legacy of multiculturalism albeit in a new and reviewed form. In our globalized world, with diasporic movements across cultures, these enlightened Muslims can represent the west as it is than the warped images which reduce the west to a crude caricature. This new model of multiculturalism may take as its starting point the kind of integration which, one assuages Muslims fears, that living in the west does not mean or necessarily entail loss of faith, and second also lays the onus of integrating with the broader society on both Muslims themselves and members of the broader societies too. In other others, review the model of citizenship by rendering it into an active model and allow the impetus of integration come from within by demonstrating the soft power of liberal societies. The alternative-extreme models of assimilation –may send a wrong message to Muslims both within and without. A message that validates the fears of some Muslims that the west is out on an all out assault on Islam and renders the passive majority of Muslims if not open to the suasions of extremists but certainly sympathetic to them. This is a message that does not need to be sent out at this delicate moment of tension between the Islamic worlds and the west. So Mr. Cameron, a review but not a jettisoning of the multiculturalism paradigm is called for.
Friday, August 6, 2010
Kashmir Counundrum:Some Pointers for the Indian State
The ugly denouement of the protest movement in Kashmir- -beating to its rhythm and gyrating to its own momentum- and the counter narrative of violence generated by the state has led to an impasse:the government apparently has decided to wait out and drain the protest movement of momentum while as the protesters seem to stick it out till the very 'end'.Who 'wins; or 'loses' in this macabre and gory contest is largely academic and a moot point. However, the lesson to be gleaned by all parties involved in the conflict is that the dispute over Kashmir is fresh and alive and urgently needs to be addressed lest it morphs into an inter and cross generational problem and carry spill over geo political effects. This rather clichéd assertion warrants elaboration: the Indian state's technique of containment or containing the armed insurgency may have yielded fruit in terms of neutralizing the strident militancy and insurgency but, to take recourse to a hackneyed cliché , the core issue , that is , sentiment. remain(ed) to be addressed. The sense of victory engendered by 'winning the war on insurgency' apparently has led to complacency on part of the Indian state which apparently, and especially after Sep 11, slept over the problem. The results of this complacency are now writ large , all over: massive and total alienation of Kashmiri's from the Indian state and body politic where stone pelting is the symptom of and metaphor for deeper , and wider structural problems.(Putting into perspective these structural problems is beyond the scope of this article).
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Kashmir Conundrum:Some Pointers for the Indian State
The ugly denouement of the protest movement in Kashmir- -beating to its rhythm and gyrating to its own momentum- and the counter narrative of violence generated by the state has led to an impasse:the government apparently has decided to wait out and drain the protest movement of momentum while as the protesters seem to stick it out till the very 'end'.Who 'wins; or 'loses' in this macabre and gory contest is largely academic and a moot point. However, the lesson to be gleaned by all parties involved in the conflict is that the dispute over Kashmir is fresh and alive and urgently needs to be addressed lest it morphs into an inter and cross generational problem and carry spill over geo political effects. This rather clichéd assertion warrants elaboration: the Indian state's technique of containment or containing the armed insurgency may have yielded fruit in terms of neutralizing the strident militancy and insurgency but, to take recourse to a hackneyed cliché , the core issue , that is , sentiment. remain(ed) to be addressed. The sense of victory engendered by 'winning the war on insurgency' apparently has led to complacency on part of the Indian state which apparently, and especially after Sep 11, slept over the problem. The results of this complacency are now writ large , all over: massive and total alienation of Kashmiri's from the Indian state and body politic where stone pelting is the symptom of and metaphor for deeper , and wider structural problems.(Putting into perspective these structural problems is beyond the scope of this article).
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Lahore Attacks:A RAW Deal or Chicken Coming Home to Roost?
The frontal (and brazen) attacks on the cultural heart of Pakistan points out to the systemic nature of problems that Pakistan faces. These attacks along with the general state of contemporary Pakistan have the making or the trappings of a bizarre Kafkaesque drama unfolding in Pakistan. As a corollary, credence is lent to the oft repeated assertion that the ‘land of the pure’ is in the grips(or throes) of a severe identity crisis and is essentially at war with itself. It is too facile and simplistic to finger point at either India’s intelligence services or the usual run of the mill ‘foreign hand’ thing. The coordinated assaults in tandem with gory instances of suicide bombings across Pakistan come at a critical juncture: the expansion of war by Pakistan’s state apparatus (or the army) in Pakistan’s tribal areas and given the choice of targets is clearly meant to send a strong signal or make a strong statement. That is, the people orchestrating these daring attacks are demonstrating their ability to challenging the writ of the fragile Pakistani state anywhere in the territory of Pakistan, by implication mocking the state apparatus of Pakistan and thereby demonstrating that they too can enlarge or expand the conflict and take the battle to the enemy.(The enemy here is obviously the Pakistani state).In this asymmetric conflict or more appropriately war, the losers are the state and people of Pakistan. The question that arises or the apposite question is: why have things come to this bloody pass? The answer is complicated given the complex and complicated tangle that Pakistan has gotten itself into. However a sober analysis of the nature of the Pakistani state, its concomitant or attendant trajectory and policy stances (or postures) may yield some insights. It stands to reason that the Pakistani state has, given the ambiguity or the dissonance between the rhetoric that underpinned its formation, the nature of its state formation and its various permutations and combinations, has morphed into a national security state with the army at the heart of this institutional complex. Supported by a web of intelligence agencies and other ancillary state apparatii, this condition has entailed the morphing or degenerating of politics or the political process into mere administration. A natural concomitant of this degeneration is the cacophony of unrealistic demands and pressures on the Pakistani state which, in turn has led to a loss of focus and concentration of resources towards insalubrious ends. Hence state society relations in Pakistan remain or are comprehensively at odds with each other. Allied or wedded to this condition is the foreign policy stance of the Pakistani state. It(stance) means constant confrontation with its largest neighbor , India and the kind of interest in Afghanistan whose nature has been unsalutary for Pakistan and its politics. The means employed has entailed instrumentalizing Pakistan’s youth bulge towards ends that the Pakistani establishment deems as its overarching national interest. The concatenation of these elements, in turn has meant that Pakistan, in its external posture plays a double game or adopts a posture where a delicate balancing act is inherent .Pak-United States relation and its various permutations and combinations may be a classic instance of this. In this situation, state society relations suffer and mutual acrimony and suspicion defines the relationship between the US and Pakistan. On one end of the spectrum, Pakistan’s cosying up to the US in the post Cold War world lends grist to the mill of conspiracy theories whose manifestation is rampant anti Americanism and at the other end disaffection on part of those who have been coopted in the foreign policy posture of Pakistan.The results of all these is contemporary Pakistan: a nation rent and riven by violencs and essentially at war with itself. Now after having identified some of the main features of the Pakistani state and politics inhering in it, the question morphs into: How can Pakistan come out of the problems it has brought upon itself? The answer in the form of a prescription that strikes the mind is wholesale reorientation of the Pakistani state, its political economy, the alignment of the Pakistani state with its society and a foreign policy posture that enables Pakistan to eke out a respectable and honorable status in the comity of nations. More concretely, this means serious introspection and the return of politics to the blight riven land. Or take recourse to a nationalism that is inclusive and reorient the state toward enabling it to meet the real and germane demands of the citizens of Pakistan. Concomitantly this may entail taking a fresh look at relations between India and Pakistan and the dispute over Kashmir. The gelling of these factors or elements and vigorous efforts to bring these to fruition may lead to a naya Pakistan: a Pakistan defined by peace, prosperity and happiness for all its denizens and at peace with itself and the world at large.
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