Kashmir Counundrum:Some Pointers for the Indian State

The ugly denouement of the protest movement in Kashmir- -beating to its rhythm and gyrating to its own momentum- and the counter narrative of violence generated by the state has led to an impasse:the government apparently has decided to wait out and drain the protest movement of momentum while as the protesters seem to stick it out till the very 'end'.Who 'wins; or 'loses' in this macabre and gory contest is largely academic and a moot point. However, the lesson to be gleaned by all parties involved in the conflict is that the dispute over Kashmir is fresh and alive and urgently needs to be addressed lest it morphs into an inter and cross generational problem and carry spill over geo political effects. This rather clichéd assertion warrants elaboration: the Indian state's technique of containment or containing the armed insurgency may have yielded fruit in terms of neutralizing the strident militancy and insurgency but, to take recourse to a hackneyed cliché , the core issue , that is , sentiment. remain(ed) to be addressed. The sense of victory engendered by 'winning the war on insurgency' apparently has led to complacency on part of the Indian state which apparently, and especially after Sep 11, slept over the problem. The results of this complacency are now writ large , all over: massive and total alienation of Kashmiri's from the Indian state and body politic where stone pelting is the symptom of and metaphor for deeper , and wider structural problems.(Putting into perspective these structural problems is beyond the scope of this article).
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.

Kashmir Conundrum:Some Pointers for the Indian State

The ugly denouement of the protest movement in Kashmir- -beating to its rhythm and gyrating to its own momentum- and the counter narrative of violence generated by the state has led to an impasse:the government apparently has decided to wait out and drain the protest movement of momentum while as the protesters seem to stick it out till the very 'end'.Who 'wins; or 'loses' in this macabre and gory contest is largely academic and a moot point. However, the lesson to be gleaned by all parties involved in the conflict is that the dispute over Kashmir is fresh and alive and urgently needs to be addressed lest it morphs into an inter and cross generational problem and carry spill over geo political effects. This rather clichéd assertion warrants elaboration: the Indian state's technique of containment or containing the armed insurgency may have yielded fruit in terms of neutralizing the strident militancy and insurgency but, to take recourse to a hackneyed cliché , the core issue , that is , sentiment. remain(ed) to be addressed. The sense of victory engendered by 'winning the war on insurgency' apparently has led to complacency on part of the Indian state which apparently, and especially after Sep 11, slept over the problem. The results of this complacency are now writ large , all over: massive and total alienation of Kashmiri's from the Indian state and body politic where stone pelting is the symptom of and metaphor for deeper , and wider structural problems.(Putting into perspective these structural problems is beyond the scope of this article).
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.

Lahore Attacks:A RAW Deal or Chicken Coming Home to Roost?

The frontal (and brazen) attacks on the cultural heart of Pakistan points out to the systemic nature of problems that Pakistan faces. These attacks along with the general state of contemporary Pakistan have the making or the trappings of a bizarre Kafkaesque drama unfolding in Pakistan. As a corollary, credence is lent to the oft repeated assertion that the ‘land of the pure’ is in the grips(or throes) of a severe identity crisis and is essentially at war with itself. It is too facile and simplistic to finger point at either India’s intelligence services or the usual run of the mill ‘foreign hand’ thing. The coordinated assaults in tandem with gory instances of suicide bombings across Pakistan come at a critical juncture: the expansion of war by Pakistan’s state apparatus (or the army) in Pakistan’s tribal areas and given the choice of targets is clearly meant to send a strong signal or make a strong statement. That is, the people orchestrating these daring attacks are demonstrating their ability to challenging the writ of the fragile Pakistani state anywhere in the territory of Pakistan, by implication mocking the state apparatus of Pakistan and thereby demonstrating that they too can enlarge or expand the conflict and take the battle to the enemy.(The enemy here is obviously the Pakistani state).In this asymmetric conflict or more appropriately war, the losers are the state and people of Pakistan. The question that arises or the apposite question is: why have things come to this bloody pass? The answer is complicated given the complex and complicated tangle that Pakistan has gotten itself into. However a sober analysis of the nature of the Pakistani state, its concomitant or attendant trajectory and policy stances (or postures) may yield some insights. It stands to reason that the Pakistani state has, given the ambiguity or the dissonance between the rhetoric that underpinned its formation, the nature of its state formation and its various permutations and combinations, has morphed into a national security state with the army at the heart of this institutional complex. Supported by a web of intelligence agencies and other ancillary state apparatii, this condition has entailed the morphing or degenerating of politics or the political process into mere administration. A natural concomitant of this degeneration is the cacophony of unrealistic demands and pressures on the Pakistani state which, in turn has led to a loss of focus and concentration of resources towards insalubrious ends. Hence state society relations in Pakistan remain or are comprehensively at odds with each other. Allied or wedded to this condition is the foreign policy stance of the Pakistani state. It(stance) means constant confrontation with its largest neighbor , India and the kind of interest in Afghanistan whose nature has been unsalutary for Pakistan and its politics. The means employed has entailed instrumentalizing Pakistan’s youth bulge towards ends that the Pakistani establishment deems as its overarching national interest. The concatenation of these elements, in turn has meant that Pakistan, in its external posture plays a double game or adopts a posture where a delicate balancing act is inherent .Pak-United States relation and its various permutations and combinations may be a classic instance of this. In this situation, state society relations suffer and mutual acrimony and suspicion defines the relationship between the US and Pakistan. On one end of the spectrum, Pakistan’s cosying up to the US in the post Cold War world lends grist to the mill of conspiracy theories whose manifestation is rampant anti Americanism and at the other end disaffection on part of those who have been coopted in the foreign policy posture of Pakistan.The results of all these is contemporary Pakistan: a nation rent and riven by violencs and essentially at war with itself. Now after having identified some of the main features of the Pakistani state and politics inhering in it, the question morphs into: How can Pakistan come out of the problems it has brought upon itself? The answer in the form of a prescription that strikes the mind is wholesale reorientation of the Pakistani state, its political economy, the alignment of the Pakistani state with its society and a foreign policy posture that enables Pakistan to eke out a respectable and honorable status in the comity of nations. More concretely, this means serious introspection and the return of politics to the blight riven land. Or take recourse to a nationalism that is inclusive and reorient the state toward enabling it to meet the real and germane demands of the citizens of Pakistan. Concomitantly this may entail taking a fresh look at relations between India and Pakistan and the dispute over Kashmir. The gelling of these factors or elements and vigorous efforts to bring these to fruition may lead to a naya Pakistan: a Pakistan defined by peace, prosperity and happiness for all its denizens and at peace with itself and the world at large.

Can Pakistan Resolve its Existential Trilemma?

Can Pakistan resolve its existential crisis?
Wajahat Qazi Pakistan's contemporary condition - a state of anarchy and the possibility of drifting into a failed (or fragile) state - may best be characterized by a formulation referred to as an existential trilemma: severe domestic strife and anarchy, the possibility of balkanization or bantustanization, and last bit not the least, the loss of its sovereign status. This condition, it would appear accrues from the nature of its state-society relations, a melange of a torturous history, apparently unbridgeable ethnic cleavages, unresponsive mediatory state institutions, and the ideological glue that is supposed to accord coherence to Pakistan.
It is held that its foreign policy posture - whether it be its interest in Afghanistan or Kashmir accrues from these sets of conditions. What is in dispute or under contention is not the nature or merit of these assertions or contentions but the solution that is held to be the panacea for Pakistan's teeming troubles: the election of Asif Ali Zardari to the highest office of the country and the elevation of the party he 'inherited' by default, the Pakistan People's Party. We are told that this 'solution' would accord plenitude and closure to the beleaguered nation state. Validation for this assertion is provided or offered by organs of the United Sates' foreign policy apparatus, working, apparently at cross purposes and begetting a situation where organizational prestige and turf wars acquire precedence over the national interests of either Pakistan or the United States.This, in essence, and counter intuitively means or implies legitimizing the current drift in or of Pakistan’s politics: the politics of vendetta, revenge and humiliation. A clear cut instance of this is the 'plan' or 'program' that Zardari’s PPP as laid out for the 'revival' of Pakistan: populism (wheat subsidies that ultimately mean draining the exchequer and a prelude to queuing up at the twin sisters-World Bank and the IMF aimed to undercut Nawaz Sharrif's appeal in the Punjab, recourse to feudal (or medieval) politics to garner vote share in Baluchistan, and hitching Pakistan's wagon to the national security paradigms of the US or offering Pakistan's services to the United States on a platter without a genuine quid pro quo. Now the question(s) are: what is this strange set of these assumptions that, at best, present a temporary expedient and at worst a full circle for Pakistan predicated upon? And what is the confidence of my view premised upon? The answer to the former question, necessarily a speculative exercise, may lie in the nature of post September 11 Pakistan-US alliance politics, the US electoral cycle, the need for a recalibration of military-politico strategy in Afghanistan, and the inter turf conflict that defines or characterizes the various organs of the US' Foreign Policy establishment. And to former, I would posit or draw the attention to the nature of Pakistan's polity and its contemporary drift and or condition. Before venturing further, I would like to point out that this approach, that appears to be gaining traction and some legitimacy, both within and without Pakistan guarantees a full circle for Pakistan. That is, the lurch from one extreme to another, where the interregnum(s) and pauses are filled by ostensible representatives of the people, and inevitably followed by the 'intervention' of the armed forces to restore equilibrium. This 'recipe', needless to point out, may not be what Pakistan or the world or international community needs. Pakistan, in order to be a valuable and valued member of the international community and a proud and a confident post modern nation state needs the kind of course correction that it is genuine: one that comes from within and in the process genuine support and assurances by the international community is accorded to it. Now how can this be brought about? Or what kind of course correction (or review) would constitute a solution that rids Pakistan of its persistent malignancies?First and foremost, a review of the nature of Pakistan is warranted. Its identity needs to be firmly anchored and grounded in or under a framework or grid that redeems it in its own eyes. This may mean taking recourse to a nationalism that binds its various peoples under a common framework and subsumes the pulls and pressures that ethnic differences lead to. Second, is the urgent need to consolidate the remit of the Pakistani state and make or render its sovereignty real. Third would be to impart expansive citizenship rights to its people so that every Pakistani has or holds a stake in Pakistan. This 'prescription', of course, means improved and efficient governance. A follow up step would be to realign Pakistan's political economy and wed it to the global economy. Another reform that merits a review is its education system: the focus and thrust of the reform should be on imparting an expansive and eclectic education. A natural corollary, that effectives ties these together and brings them to fruition would perhaps be to rejig Pakistan’s political system and render it into a more effective unitary and centralized state- at least for the foreseeable future. Last but not the least, is the review of nature of its alliance with the wounded hegemon, the United States. Mutual cynicism, both on part of the US and Pakistan permeates alliance. This has to change. And this change is contingent on designing and articulating a grand strategy toward Pakistan that factors in the elements identified in this article and importantly not mean ignoring influential institutions of Pakistan: the Army and the ISI. Bringing them, on board or rendering them into genuine partners may be a prudent strategy or tactic. Otherwise it will be plus ca change, plus la meme thing with Pakistan performing a balancing act- either over Afghanistan or Kashmir, and the US venting out in ways that further alienate Pakistanis. Now the question: Can Zardari or the PPP pull it off? His past record, even after discounting or accounting for a born again Zardari does not offer much of a consolation. Neither, as we have seen, does his 'plan' or 'program'. It is here that the United States' role acquires salience: it (the US) for the sake of its national and security interests should discard expediency look harder and engage promising leaders and politicians among the younger cohort. That is, the kind who are not yet tainted by either bitterness or cynicism and have a vision for Pakistan. This may mean looking beyond the party system(s) or affiliations, culling the best and the brightest and engaging them. A clear cut delineation and implementation of the elements identified here may hopefully resolve Pakistan’s existential trilemma and enable it to reclaim honorable and legitimate space, the one articulated by its visionary founder for itslef in the post modern world and a dynamic, vibrant and plural Pakistan may come into being.

Ragda II

Ragda II

The deaths of stone pelting young men(or boys) followed by the alleged gang rape - murder most foul of women at the cusp of their lives- and the violence and counter violence on part of the state apparatus of Jammu and Kashmir is most likely to lead a rerun of Ragda I. Given the eerie parallel, in terms of the prelude to Ragda I, this (rerun) may be referred to as Ragda II. The prelude to Ragda II amid the cacophony of noise and clamor that it has bred among both ‘mainstream’ and separatist politicians raises more questions than it answers. The sets of inferences to drawn are manifold. However the major or main inference or even conclusion that one may draw is the obvious: Kashmir remains unsettled and the dispute over it warrants or merits resolution. This obvious ‘catechism’ is more poignant and salient given the rather spontaneity of the politics of protest- post militarization of the conflict-where the initiative has been taken away from the separatist political leadership and that it is the ‘ordinary’ people who are at the fore front of the protest. The question or sets of questions that arise are: are these protests likely to go in vain? Will the prelude generate a momentum that in the final scheme of things will go awry like the previous one? What role does the separatist leadership play? What could be the potential response of the ‘mainstream’ leadership? Is demilitarization the answer to the problems inherent in a wide and deep troop spread in the valley? Or is it merely a component of the dispute and thus merely a micro phenomenon that coud lbe be obviated once the real issue is resolved? Elaborating on the answer(s) to each of these questions is beyond the scope of this piece. However, the theme that cuts across these sets of questions is, to repeat myself, Kashmir or the dispute over Kashmir aches or cries for a resolution and that the attritive capabilities/capacities of the Indian state have not laid to rest the nature of the dispute over Kashmir. Now the question is what can or what is to be done to both alleviate the potential of Ragda II and simultaneously alleviate to the extent it can be , the dispute over Kashmir.(The answer is necessarily both normative as well as descriptive…).First, let us explore the context. That is, the structural problems and the concomitant identity crisis that Pakistan, the country that deems itself to be party to the dispute, has gotten into. It is increasingly obvious that this neighboring country has gotten into such a morass that it can no longer follow up on the dispute over Kashmir with the vigor it used and as far as the eye can see it may drop its claim on Kashmir and focus on its internal problems. Second, even a cursory examination of the politics of the sole superpower, the United States suggests that it’s interest in the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir is a far cry from the principle of self determination of peoples and is more related to its domestic politics and homeland security.(This further reduces the scope of Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir given that Pakistan is now in the ‘ eye of the storm’, so to speak).Third and perhaps more important is the increase in the prestige and power of India .It(India) is increasingly headed to great power status and is gradually becoming or morphing into a custodian of the international system and structure. Fourth, the international system is so clogged and , to use a strong word, clogged that it may not bear the creation of new states.(The process of decolonization that , in some senses, generated failed states is another worry and a burden that the international system is loath to bear again. This I am sure must be a factor in the superpower calculus of decision making..). So where does this leave the dispute over Kashmir and the concomitant politics of protest where the separatist leadership has lost the initiative and appears to be taking its cues from the protests itself? As is implied in the preceding discussion, maximalist claims are more likely to lead to a situation which begets an impasse (or a dead end) and the energy of the prelude to Ragda II would stand dissipated. This calls for introspection on part of all parties involved and calls for the solution that is non zero sum or in other words a win win situation. The obvious solution that strikes the mind is a kind of solution that calls for creativity and expansiveness on the relevant parties. Or in other words work toward a solution that allows all parties to converge on a solution that allows all parties an exit that is honorable and ultimately which leads to a lasting solution to the dispute.The obvious solution or more specifically the contours of the solution may be to ask for Greater Autonomy for the state.This as far as the eye can see may be the most optimal solution given the complexities of ths dispute and the arguments elaborated in the piece. This (solution) may be palatable to all parties given the context while the others may mean mere posturing or , to use a metaphor, tilting against the windmills. Panning of this solution may also mean or entail obviating the problems and issues that have arisen out of the catalysts that have spurred the current protest: death , rapine and murder. So let us make haste slowly and work with due diligence and sincerity toward ends that are attainable.

On Australianness:An Ode to a Lost Bosom

Time to Excoriate the Lucky Country Myth: An Ode to a Lost Bosom The public commentary on Australia's explicit apology to its Aborigines-an interesting admixture of exuberance , mania and dollops of sobriety-perhaps warrants a revisit of the lucky country myth:one that has offered a beguilingly facile interprtetation of Australia's evolution into a self assured nationhood.These reactions - perhaps natural and inevitable for nations which reach plenitude-have brought into focus the varying perspecives that the denizens of contemporary Australia hold of their collective self.All in all a salutary and sanguine condition which nonetheless carries some cautionary overtones too.Cautionary because of the redactive nature of the commentary that plays down some very signifiant aspects of Australian history and ,of course ,in the process playing up of the miseries that visited Australias wounded civilization, its Aborigines.The media commentary in some senses is ahistorical and redective though.And the sociological and anthropological insights it offers into the nature of the Aboriginal condition do not appear to be very germane.One can excuse the reductivesness on account of being written as columns.The larger point(s), however, that this enthusing commentary and reaction raises go right to heart of contemprorary Australia: a nation that has attained plenitude and is on the cusp of a higher destiny and pedestal.One which defies the crude caricature and stereotype of it being a 'lucky country' and one which offers a testimony to the genius of its people(s).Now these sets of assertions need to be put into a perspective by setting forth a very brief overview of Australian history.This detour may enable us to gain a better handle on the true nature of Australian historys' victims ,survivors and pioneers and in the process, hopefully , chart or point to the future that awaits it. First ,a a note on the nature of the self exculpatory apology or the intense emphasis on it.A word of caution is called for here:exuberant or manic urges towards , for want of a better word, self loathing and holding the collective unconscious of a generation culpable in 'crimes' committed by either default or design by preceding generation is a tad rich.That is to say, it is unhealthy.Simply.The self acclaimed diagnosticians of the Australian condition should deem not it to be the balm that creates healthy amnesia.I have in mind here the stigma and embarassment that many Australians carry as part of their unfortunate legacy.It, counterintuitively may create self loathing individual or personalities.It may not be as crude as the Ned Kelly or the Bush Ranger iconography but nonetheless is not a healthy antidote.Now let us return to the overview of Australia's history and the apology.The rubric under which it(apology) has been offered is too broad and reductive:it implicates , I repeat generations of , for wanr of a better word settlers who , partly on account of the wretched and abominable conditions, they found themselves in and partly out of fear of the unknown and the 'strange' may have rendered the existence of a peoples difficult and untenable.Lest I be misunderstood here, this assertion is by no means intended to exonerate.Neither is it not meant to demean or discount the sufferings of a culture or peoples who continue to bear the brunt of the past or history.The larger point is to accord credit where it is due and apportion blame where needed or required in due measure Australia's history and success in forging a polity that could be righlty called the envy of the world testifies to its hard and well earned nationhood. Its existence as nation and state or state nation is , as perhaps we all know is owed to the very harsh dialectic that defined the conditions of its 'transported' peoples-the , if one may borrow an expression and invert it , the Wretched of the Earth.That is, peoples who , initially ,on account of their social and economic position in a class riven society, and, later 'political crimes' were pushed onto a territory that could best be described , crudely, as a 'hell hole'.Dante's inferno , in fact ,may be more apposite and germane here.The journey to this inferno was no by no means a first class one.One need not go into vivid detail here.Now rendering a penal colony , though a painful and involuted process, into an entity that could be called a nation at a later point in time can be nothing but a tribute to these experimented upon 'refuse' of class riven and snotty pre colonial Britain.The aim here is not to whitewash crimes or attrocities but to put, briefly ,the historical journey or trajectory of Australia into a sober perspective. These entrepreneurs -doughty and fiesty- forged a country out of nothing amid the most difficult circumstances and conditions , to repeat myself here.So much so that one is strained to find parallels(if any) in the modern epoch of such an exercize in nation building.Australia, for instance, does not appear to have had either the advantage of a sophisticated elite that could will a nation into being or 'imagine ' it.Or enjoy a geopolitical vantage point or interest ,which played such a crucial role in the forging of most other nations .Neither was it the crucible or arena where overhwhelming religious energy (and zeal)of warring Christian sects or denominations denoued or panned out and by default led to an entity that could claim nationhood.It(Australia) thus is what it is : a nation forged out of a penal colony through a dialectic and painful process of trial and error.The brief nature of this essay does not lend itself to laying out examples or instances of these processes. One may in the interests of brevity posit that the theme that emerges out of this Australian odyssey is that of forging a habitable milieu over a period of time, which in turn morphed into into a nation or state or state and nation depending on ones point of view of the penal colony.And that serendipity had no room in project Australia.An ancillary but more remaarkable theme that may be called Australianness that emerges from Australia's history is an innate ability-with spasms of periodic angst and vituperation against the'outsider and the strange and the exotic '-to constanty redefine and reinvent itself: a gift that very few nations or societies are blessed with. This process, to say the least, has been painful.Innumerable victims were exacted in or through this painful transition into a normal society and polity.The tolls were both psychological and physical-the ones who survived were a scarred people who could not escape easily the traumas that transportaion and the subsequent travails entailed.And what jarred with for the fruits of the penal colony were the strigmas and taboos associated in their Australianness-a stigmatizing terms pregnant with taboo' s.The doughty Australians nonetheless excoriated ,to an extent, these stigmas and went about forging a polity and nation that accorded them a history that, howsoever, scarred , and a destiny, they could call their own.The continuation of this remarkable and unusual journey towards self determination and self discovery continues and is the real genius of Australia and its peoples.The apology to aboriginals is but a continuation on this theme at one level and a panning out or the birth pangs of Australias new collective self. Now let us turn to the apology.Or more accurately the commentary on the apology or the recieved opinion.First, the sociological and anthropological insights that this commentary offers into the nature of the Aboriginal condition does not appear to be very germane..The aboriginals have been referred to as either custodians of the land that the 'settlers' found or inhabtitants of the land and the transported peoples as colonizers and settlers.The truth may lie somewhat in the middle.That is to say, that this rubric or umbrella of clubbing together aboriginals, 'settler's and or 'colonials' and the dichotomizing them neatly may not hold.The blighted 'scum' and their tormentors- the soldiers or and the sailors were never a monolithic group.(Eminent and distinguished historians hold that even the benighted conditions of the place where they landed did not suffice to hold them together as a group).Hence is rendered the colonial theory or calculated or pre meditated genocide theory rather spurious). Now let us examine the claims put forth on behalf of the aborigines.The claim that Aboriginals did refer to or deem themselves as custodians of the land dos not lent itlsef to sober examination.They are -with due respect to their cultural legacy and rights-inherent wanderers.A settled life is inimical to them-the unsalubrious effects of exposure to western diet, for instance, may be a good example of this.Their tribal mores and ways of life render them if they can be classified as tribes more or less a sub culture that may be happy or content within a space accorded to them by the broader society.Ths does not imply marginalization or exclusion but rather an acceptance of a different way or life.Call it cultural relativism if you.In fact, this mey be better for thier wounded pride that the alternative:tokenism and symbolism.Historically their encounter with the 'white race' has been rife with conflict and an inability to understand the premises that undergird the broader host society rendering them in the process ope to abuse and exploitation.Now this condition may be obviated, if I venture into the domain of offering suggestions and pointers by offering these people a space-cultural and political- of thier own-under the umbrella or rubric of the broader polity and society.Then , of course, the onus also or may largely fall on them to prove themselves a rightful and prideful and dignified members of the Australian firmament.The alternatives -paternalism and symbolism -may render the apology either infructous(by default) or in a trenchant counterdenouing pathos , a parody. Now this potential that I have identified may or may not come to pass.It is contingent.It however carries larger lessons or implications for Australia's polity and society.First and foremost, and more broadly,in terms of what it reflects ,the obvious:the flexibility and self confidence of contemporary Australia.Second, and perhaps more importanty the putative revision of liberal theory adn pracice , which is premised , roughly speaking on individual rights with a focus on the individual.It appears that given the nature of the world we inhabit and the inability of political systems in place on advanced democracies to protect or deal with minortites have been found wanting.Hence a review.More specifially, in terms of Australia, it appears to be chosen , so to speak, to be at the forefront of this new expermiment.This reading may or may nor imply over analysis.However there does appear to be merit to this.And barring some hiccups and teething problems , the price of which may have been hard for some individuals , Australia, to say at the risk of understatement appears to be doing well.It is a remarkable nation and state that has forged a polity, society and economy that can onky be the envy of the world.The evolving outlook of its deniizens especially the younger people and those inhabiting its metros is remarkable for its sophistication.(I am of course dicounting or ignoring here the bigots and ignorami.These people do not have a monopoly over Australia:they are everyhwere). The gelling together or convergence of all these elements is what may be called Ausrtralia's soft power.That is ,roughly speaking the power to attract on account of values , polity and society.(Nothing save or but Australia can squander its soft power).This, by implication, is its security policy both on the domestic as well as the international front.However there exists an inherent danger:Australia on account of , to use a cliched term, 'entanglements abroad' which have domestic implications in terms of ugly or recourse to a Kafkaesque state posture may render its soft power a tad rough on its edges.It is upto Australians and the projection of their collective self through the mediating tenor of their values and polity to ensure security, prosperity and happiness for all Australians.A corollary to this makes us us return to the concluding theme of contemporary Australian nationhood rendered poigant by or for which the lightning rod has been the apology: first it suggests that the work of nations is never complete.Renewal and redefintion define or are the hallmarks of nations that be.Last but not the least, it(apology) may be a prelude to a wider ad broader schism or split from the 'mother'country.This may be the real and long lasting message or the implicit , explicit as well as comprehensive break from some imprisoning paradigms.The land down under has evolved and charted its own path.Now is the time to be a real nation and state in its own right.A bold and beautiful destiny awaits.

The Crisis of Global Capitalism

Does it represent the need for a drastic repair of capitalism?
Wajahat Qazi A common denominator or theme underpins the lynching of a Gurgaon based executive of an MNC, the politicized protest against the takeover of land by the flagship Indian corporate brand, TATA, in the erstwhile bastion of Indian communism, West Bengal, the urban rural divide in China obfuscated and obscured by 'Chinese nationalism', or closer to the 'developed world', the neighbourhood- suburban divide, the fallout of the financial meltdown- a function of, at the risk of oversimplification, the breakdown between the risk return trade-off, the 'bail out', policy prescriptions under debate , foreclosures and of course other consequences.
This theme-identified and articulated by the eminent Dr. Kissinger - a testimony to his prescience and sagacity even though tinged with a degree of cynicism- at the tail end of the tumultuous decade (the nineties): an interlude that may be best described as an unearned holiday from history-stares us in the face: the marginalization of the dispossessed and the excluded from the 'gale' of 'free market' capitalism. This sweeping overview is of course open to questions and criticism. However, it raises a set of salient and germane questions that can be ignored only at the risk of disaster. Is the crisis (or meltdown) and its manifestations long festering, the tip of an iceberg? Does it represent or reflect the need for a drastic repair of capitalism? Was the seventies (early) induced 'retreat of the state' an aberrant interlude? Is the state (and the government) staging a comeback? Are we back to square one? Or full circle? Or are we witnessing a gale of 'creative destruction' the market nor correcting but purging itself of excesses? That is, notional finance? Is the current phase a prelude to the formation or crystallization of a hybrid identity or in other words the regulatory state? Or more broadly, is globalization or its nature itself undergoing a review? Are we witnessing the morphing of globalization into what the Economist has called globality? And if so, what are the implications and consequences? Answers to these sets of questions are beyond the scope of this article. However, I may or would like to tease out broad contours that may (hopefully) offer some amateur insights into the unfolding 'order'. First it would appear, if I may use the formulation (or coinage) of the best and brightest minds in finance, Professor Robert Schiller, the hype and hoopla surrounding the demise of the state and the 'triumph' of free market capitalism, and a new paradigm of development was an extended bout of irrational exuberance and that we are witnessing a correction of the disease. The salubrious aspect of this 'correction' appears the nature of globalization -as a process- sullied and defined by a certain paradigm appears to be undergoing a review on account of the pent up notional excesses. Hitherto the benefits of the economic aspects of globalization have been reaped or creamed off by the elite of countries opening up to the world or integrating into the global economy-be it India, China, the blighted Middle East, or even parts of Europe. (Trickle down economics , it may be germane to point out here, is a mere gloss or to use a metaphor or slur, lip stick on a pig , to justify or put a positive spin on the uneven distribution of wealth that opening up has involved or entailed). This, stripped of its essence may mean that regardless of the market fundamentalist view of globalization may have meant vulgar promotion of the market as the panacea to all ills , the state is needed and that the 'mini crises' identified in this article reflect to the tenacity and resilience of the state. I hasten to position myself on the middle, so to speak. That is to say, I am neither a market fundamentalist nor a die-hard fan of the state. Hence the nature of my view and perhaps a natural bias toward what I intuit is appearing on the horizon: a regulatory state. That is, roughly speaking, the kind of a state that is neither inhospitable to the market nor does it allow free rein. This, in turn ,means that the globalization paradigm forced upon the throats of governments and states regardless of its flawed nature, paradoxically, should not (and in fact cannot be) be jettisoned. And that a renewed thrust on shaping the process and rendering it more humane or responsive to the needs of its most important constituency, the people is warranted. This, more specifically may mean, redesigning the architecture of global governance-reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, and involving or redesigning the nature of public private partnerships, where a multitude of stakeholders become partners to the developmental process. And of course, last but not the least, the continued involvement of the wounded hegemon in the affairs of the world. This obviously has implications for the nature and form of world order. A hands off involvement, apparently or evidently, oxymoronic, may be the best we may hope from the sole superpower. Or in other words, the kind that has been identified by some scholars as 'loose multipolarity' or even better by the historian of historians (contenporary), Niall Ferguson, as apolarity. A combination of these or a concerted attempt to bring these conditions to pass, incidentally or paradoxically, again with the assistance of the United States may bring about a semblance of world order where the entire world becomes a stakeholder in forging a better, prosperous and peaceful world. Or in other worlds globalization morphs into globality: a world order not defined by a 'race to the bottom' but by meritocracy and the kind of competition where nationality, nationalism and ideology becomes infructous.