Globalized Islam is a fact and a ‘fixture’ in most western societies now. Delinked from culture, and deterritorialized, it presents both an opportunity as well as a threat to both western societies and itself. The former because shorn of the influence of the mullahs whose esoteric scholarship and the endless world of fatwa’s disconnected from modern reality has ossified the Islamic traditions which are badly in need of reform, the prospects of Ijtehad(or enlightened reasoning) can perhaps only take place in the west. The latter because alienation or what David Cameron has aptly called ‘rootlessness’ can lead to a security as well as a social problem for western societies and also globalized Islam has the potential of transmogrifying or mutating Islam into an unrecognizable ideology in spite of the reassurances held out by the eminent Scholar Olivier Roy that globalized Islam will ultimately and inexorably go the way of Reform Judaism. This is rendered poignant and salient by the question of,’ Who Speaks for Muslims or Islam? Is it the imported mullah’s or mufti’s who can only speak in the idiom of madressah’s? Or modernist intellectuals who have made a name for themselves in their host societies but are estranged from fellow Muslims on account of either acculturation or other reasons?
Both, to repeat myself, I am afraid to say, pose insuperable problems or dilemmas for western societies and governments and Islam itself. The focus on the mullahs or imported imams, while comforting for Muslims in host societies, in terms of validation of Islamic principles for their progeny and ensuring continuity in some form of the Islamic traditions in the private sphere is a non starter. Non starter because the needs of globalized Islam are different: born and raised in western milieus, young Muslims need role models who can relate to them. It stretches reason to believe that, say a Pakistani imam trained (or schooled) only in the Deobandi tradition can relate to young Muslims in the west save perhaps the freshly arrived. Inherent in this approach also is the perpetuation of some odious accretions that Islam can do better without. The other option of modernist intellectuals begets problems too largely because these intellectuals speak from a perch that is disconnected from the reality of most Muslims in the west. Fluent in the idiom of host societies, some kind of schizophrenia- success in host societies comingled with a sense of estrangement from fellow Muslims whose problems they allegedly articulate or address- defines or marks these urbane and sophisticated intellectuals. This in a way replicates or is a microcosm of the problem of modernity or the trajectory of modernity in the Islamic worlds where the elite, schooled in the idiom of secular modernity were increasingly estranged from their constituents leading to sclerotic and warped forms of nationalism and secularism in the Arab Islamic worlds. This, in turn, created space for Islamist movements to thrive only to be repressed by the authoritarian states of the Arab Islamic world. In the west, what may happen is, that the ground may be ceded to movements like the Tableeghi Jamaat, whose monofocal emphasis on the five pillars of Islam and activism to make ‘good Muslims’ by focusing on the time of the Prophet (SAW) and mimicking the conditions of the early Muslims may be the only option available to young Muslims in the west. Or in a more extreme rendition, the field may become open for more radical imams or people espousing more radical views. So the question is what can be done or what methods can be employed to render the trajectory of globalized Islam smooth and salubrious?
The solution I would posit is that western governments, first and foremost accept that religion is here to stay in the west and that it is a need for those for whom it is the most significant and meaningful aspect of their lives and second instead of retreating from multiculturalism, which is the latest fashion these days actively, rejig existing institutional arrangements and enter into a partnership with sober and well meaning Muslim leaders. The nature of this partnership should not be along the lines of a quid pro quo but a genuine desire to integrate Islam into western societies on terms that are mutually beneficial. More specifically, this would mean or entail, traineeships for young imams who are schooled both in the western tradition as well as the Islamic one with excellent communication and leadership skills. The kind that would enable them to speak to the conditions of Muslims in the west in an idiom that they understand and more importantly educate young Muslims in the civic virtues of liberal societies and the responsibilities that this entails. Overlaying this may be an emphasis on Sufism or spiritual aspects of Islam which addresses the spiritual needs of Muslims. While this is no foolproof method that guarantees integration of Islam in the west, it may carry some insights that if applied may lead to peace within and without.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Musings on the Death of Multiculturalism in the West
Musings on the Death of Multiculturalism in the West
David Cameron’s public statement’s on the nature of ills plaguing Muslim Britain and hence the broader society and polity echo Angela Merkel’s disdain and resigned comments on multiculturalism in Germany. It would, however, be a mistake to see a parallel between Britain and Germany. Britain-proud heir to or perhaps even pioneer of multiculturalism – clearly departs from the condition of Germany where it was the policy problem or conundrum raised by the gastarbeiter(or guest workers) overlain perhaps by the problems engendered by the deepening and widening of the European Union and the structural forces of globalization catalyzed the problem rendering it in the process into a social problem. It would thus, to repeat, be a mistake to view the entire multicultural enterprise as being flawed and introduce an alternate policy straitjacket or paradigm that goes against the gravamen of diversity and pluralism. Having said this, it is about time that some of the assumptions undergirding multiculturalism and its policy implications are due for a comprehensive review.
The consensus or the evolving consensus in the west about the ills or pitfalls of multiculturalism stem largely from the failure of state encouraged or more accurately state patronized multiculturalism to inculcate the ‘we’ feeling among Muslims who have chosen to live or who for other reasons-persecution, refugees fleeing from failed states-find themselves in the west. Or in other words, state patronized multiculturalism has failed to make citizens out of Muslims in the west. This state of affairs, alarming as it is for intrinsic reasons, it must be pointed out, does not accrue from Islam or the nature of the Islamic faith. The failure lies in the lackadaisical approach towards the presence and existence of Muslims living in western societies and in the final analysis is an educational failure. By educational failure is meant that the nature of open societies, the rights, duties and responsibilities accruing from living in open societies has not been adequately explained to Muslims in the west. Having said this, I am not for one moment suggesting that western societies owe Muslims an explanation but it, for reasons of prudence and sagacity, it would have been better, if the nature of liberalism and open societies would have been made clear to Muslims in an idiom that would be understood by them.
It would be a travesty if the entire project or enterprise of multiculturalism were to be abandoned because implicit in aspects of multiculturalism is a renewed or a fresh relationship between Islam and the West. Hitherto articulated in the idiom of and colored by colonialism and the colonial legacy and, of course, the historical memory of the crusades, the contemporary encounter between Islam and the west mediated by globalization, offers a meeting point which can potentially be frictionless, from a long duree point of view. And the good thing is that it can be a good for Muslims and by extension the host societies. Good because some of the accretions that have been built upon the Islamic tradition, on account of vested interests and power of the mullahs, and that have stubbornly persisted, may be given short shrift by the contemporary encounter. Or in other words, reform of some of Islamic traditions, long overdue, and resisted by the corpus of mullahs and their patrons, within the Islamic world may actually happen in the west or on account of Islam’s contemporary encounter with the west. The doors of Ijtihad (roughly meaning, independent and enlightened reasoning), frowned upon by the extremists and fanatics may actually be opened in the west- the ancillary benefit of liberalism and the liberal tradition.
An added advantage may be that the virtues of toleration and respect for diversity- virtues that the Quran respects and enjoins- become a reflex among Muslims living in the west. Long used to living in mono cultural societies, some Muslims have, unfortunately lost this virtue and in some cases or instances may even aggressively pursue a majoritarian agenda.(Taliban ruled Afghanistan springs to mind here).Appreciation of diversity, tolerance and toleration, the ability to countenance diverse points of view may accrue only in multi cultural and liberal societies and continuing with the legacy of multiculturalism albeit in a new and reviewed form. In our globalized world, with diasporic movements across cultures, these enlightened Muslims can represent the west as it is than the warped images which reduce the west to a crude caricature. This new model of multiculturalism may take as its starting point the kind of integration which, one assuages Muslims fears, that living in the west does not mean or necessarily entail loss of faith, and second also lays the onus of integrating with the broader society on both Muslims themselves and members of the broader societies too. In other others, review the model of citizenship by rendering it into an active model and allow the impetus of integration come from within by demonstrating the soft power of liberal societies. The alternative-extreme models of assimilation –may send a wrong message to Muslims both within and without. A message that validates the fears of some Muslims that the west is out on an all out assault on Islam and renders the passive majority of Muslims if not open to the suasions of extremists but certainly sympathetic to them. This is a message that does not need to be sent out at this delicate moment of tension between the Islamic worlds and the west. So Mr. Cameron, a review but not a jettisoning of the multiculturalism paradigm is called for.
David Cameron’s public statement’s on the nature of ills plaguing Muslim Britain and hence the broader society and polity echo Angela Merkel’s disdain and resigned comments on multiculturalism in Germany. It would, however, be a mistake to see a parallel between Britain and Germany. Britain-proud heir to or perhaps even pioneer of multiculturalism – clearly departs from the condition of Germany where it was the policy problem or conundrum raised by the gastarbeiter(or guest workers) overlain perhaps by the problems engendered by the deepening and widening of the European Union and the structural forces of globalization catalyzed the problem rendering it in the process into a social problem. It would thus, to repeat, be a mistake to view the entire multicultural enterprise as being flawed and introduce an alternate policy straitjacket or paradigm that goes against the gravamen of diversity and pluralism. Having said this, it is about time that some of the assumptions undergirding multiculturalism and its policy implications are due for a comprehensive review.
The consensus or the evolving consensus in the west about the ills or pitfalls of multiculturalism stem largely from the failure of state encouraged or more accurately state patronized multiculturalism to inculcate the ‘we’ feeling among Muslims who have chosen to live or who for other reasons-persecution, refugees fleeing from failed states-find themselves in the west. Or in other words, state patronized multiculturalism has failed to make citizens out of Muslims in the west. This state of affairs, alarming as it is for intrinsic reasons, it must be pointed out, does not accrue from Islam or the nature of the Islamic faith. The failure lies in the lackadaisical approach towards the presence and existence of Muslims living in western societies and in the final analysis is an educational failure. By educational failure is meant that the nature of open societies, the rights, duties and responsibilities accruing from living in open societies has not been adequately explained to Muslims in the west. Having said this, I am not for one moment suggesting that western societies owe Muslims an explanation but it, for reasons of prudence and sagacity, it would have been better, if the nature of liberalism and open societies would have been made clear to Muslims in an idiom that would be understood by them.
It would be a travesty if the entire project or enterprise of multiculturalism were to be abandoned because implicit in aspects of multiculturalism is a renewed or a fresh relationship between Islam and the West. Hitherto articulated in the idiom of and colored by colonialism and the colonial legacy and, of course, the historical memory of the crusades, the contemporary encounter between Islam and the west mediated by globalization, offers a meeting point which can potentially be frictionless, from a long duree point of view. And the good thing is that it can be a good for Muslims and by extension the host societies. Good because some of the accretions that have been built upon the Islamic tradition, on account of vested interests and power of the mullahs, and that have stubbornly persisted, may be given short shrift by the contemporary encounter. Or in other words, reform of some of Islamic traditions, long overdue, and resisted by the corpus of mullahs and their patrons, within the Islamic world may actually happen in the west or on account of Islam’s contemporary encounter with the west. The doors of Ijtihad (roughly meaning, independent and enlightened reasoning), frowned upon by the extremists and fanatics may actually be opened in the west- the ancillary benefit of liberalism and the liberal tradition.
An added advantage may be that the virtues of toleration and respect for diversity- virtues that the Quran respects and enjoins- become a reflex among Muslims living in the west. Long used to living in mono cultural societies, some Muslims have, unfortunately lost this virtue and in some cases or instances may even aggressively pursue a majoritarian agenda.(Taliban ruled Afghanistan springs to mind here).Appreciation of diversity, tolerance and toleration, the ability to countenance diverse points of view may accrue only in multi cultural and liberal societies and continuing with the legacy of multiculturalism albeit in a new and reviewed form. In our globalized world, with diasporic movements across cultures, these enlightened Muslims can represent the west as it is than the warped images which reduce the west to a crude caricature. This new model of multiculturalism may take as its starting point the kind of integration which, one assuages Muslims fears, that living in the west does not mean or necessarily entail loss of faith, and second also lays the onus of integrating with the broader society on both Muslims themselves and members of the broader societies too. In other others, review the model of citizenship by rendering it into an active model and allow the impetus of integration come from within by demonstrating the soft power of liberal societies. The alternative-extreme models of assimilation –may send a wrong message to Muslims both within and without. A message that validates the fears of some Muslims that the west is out on an all out assault on Islam and renders the passive majority of Muslims if not open to the suasions of extremists but certainly sympathetic to them. This is a message that does not need to be sent out at this delicate moment of tension between the Islamic worlds and the west. So Mr. Cameron, a review but not a jettisoning of the multiculturalism paradigm is called for.
Friday, August 6, 2010
Kashmir Counundrum:Some Pointers for the Indian State
The ugly denouement of the protest movement in Kashmir- -beating to its rhythm and gyrating to its own momentum- and the counter narrative of violence generated by the state has led to an impasse:the government apparently has decided to wait out and drain the protest movement of momentum while as the protesters seem to stick it out till the very 'end'.Who 'wins; or 'loses' in this macabre and gory contest is largely academic and a moot point. However, the lesson to be gleaned by all parties involved in the conflict is that the dispute over Kashmir is fresh and alive and urgently needs to be addressed lest it morphs into an inter and cross generational problem and carry spill over geo political effects. This rather clichéd assertion warrants elaboration: the Indian state's technique of containment or containing the armed insurgency may have yielded fruit in terms of neutralizing the strident militancy and insurgency but, to take recourse to a hackneyed cliché , the core issue , that is , sentiment. remain(ed) to be addressed. The sense of victory engendered by 'winning the war on insurgency' apparently has led to complacency on part of the Indian state which apparently, and especially after Sep 11, slept over the problem. The results of this complacency are now writ large , all over: massive and total alienation of Kashmiri's from the Indian state and body politic where stone pelting is the symptom of and metaphor for deeper , and wider structural problems.(Putting into perspective these structural problems is beyond the scope of this article).
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Kashmir Conundrum:Some Pointers for the Indian State
The ugly denouement of the protest movement in Kashmir- -beating to its rhythm and gyrating to its own momentum- and the counter narrative of violence generated by the state has led to an impasse:the government apparently has decided to wait out and drain the protest movement of momentum while as the protesters seem to stick it out till the very 'end'.Who 'wins; or 'loses' in this macabre and gory contest is largely academic and a moot point. However, the lesson to be gleaned by all parties involved in the conflict is that the dispute over Kashmir is fresh and alive and urgently needs to be addressed lest it morphs into an inter and cross generational problem and carry spill over geo political effects. This rather clichéd assertion warrants elaboration: the Indian state's technique of containment or containing the armed insurgency may have yielded fruit in terms of neutralizing the strident militancy and insurgency but, to take recourse to a hackneyed cliché , the core issue , that is , sentiment. remain(ed) to be addressed. The sense of victory engendered by 'winning the war on insurgency' apparently has led to complacency on part of the Indian state which apparently, and especially after Sep 11, slept over the problem. The results of this complacency are now writ large , all over: massive and total alienation of Kashmiri's from the Indian state and body politic where stone pelting is the symptom of and metaphor for deeper , and wider structural problems.(Putting into perspective these structural problems is beyond the scope of this article).
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Now this strange lapse on part of the Indian state raises a set of questions:what led to this complacency?What factors account for this?Why is or has been the Indian state unresponsive to the cacophony of demands raised by the protesters?Why the stonewalling?Is the Indian state and the powers that be in India afraid of taking bold steps?Is it the nature of democracy that is at fault here?Or would the revamp of the Indian political system make the system more response?Does a more responsive Indian state entail a redefinition of the Indian National Interest?Is the idea of India so weak that it cannot countenance claims like those articulated by Kashmiri's?Or is the Indian state afraid of the so called 'wild fire effect' and the attendant balkanization of India?The answer(s) to these questions necessarily lead us to an admixture of theorizing and speculation. First, let us address the Idea of India , its implications over and the nature of the conflict in Kashmir.
The idea of India , it would appear,has successfully withstood many challenges to to it-linguistic, economic cultural and secessionist. It's rather successful blend of unitary government flavored with a federal character has not only withstood challenges but accommodated them and groups demanding seccession and independence have been successfully co opted. So the 'wild fire' effect and the attendant fears of balkanization may not be germane. The Indian state;s response to both the insurgency in Kashmir and the problems that the conflict has engendered has been the usual one:beat the 'shit' out of the adversary and then whittle the opponent down in a game of attrition. While this approach or technique may have worked in Punjab and Assam, it , as the evolving situation demonstrates , is a non starter in Kashmir. Insofar Kashmir is concerned, it indeed is a special issue (its history and evolution attest to this) ,one that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of straitjacketed responses by the Indian state. It demands(warrants) an out of the box solution that may entail measures that could be politically unpalatable for the political parties and the political process. Hitherto, we have seen that it is populism and populist notions dished out as potential solutions to the Kashmir imbroglio. Witness the BJP's clamor over the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that ensures special status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. OR the wrong framing of the conflict as one of essentialism. That is, reducing it to a Hindu- Muslim conflict and thus rendering it conceptually irresolvable and insoluble. Populism and 'populist 'solutions-the bane of democracies and democratic polities- will not do and will only ensure that the issue remains unresolved.In a country like India, where the majority of the population is Hindu, essentializing the dispute means pandering to the baser aspects of human nature and guarantees that the political party which want to tackle the dispute head on is doomed. So what can be done?
What needs or what may be needed to be done, is a conceptual redefinition of the Indian national interest and then building a consensus over this redefined national interest. This requires boldness, political acumen and leadership-all of which appear to be lacking in the Indian polity contemporarily. A redefined national interest gels and blends with emerging India's self image:that of an economic powerhouse and parity with other Great Powers.In this scheme of things, India and especially its emerging , affluent and self confident middle class can afford to take a more enlightened view on the conflict in Kashmir and crystallize a paradigm shift that frees the conflict from encustrances and encumbrances rendering it palatable to all parties involved in the dispute.This bottoms up pressure on the Indian political system and politicians may however be too optimistic.So we now take recourse another suggestion that takes into account the prosaic reality of the Indian polity, that is the sentiments of the masses or the 'hoi polloi'
In the final analysis, perhaps, at a macro level, it may be the rejigging of the Indian political system that may redound positively both to India's political stability and for the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir. I am thinking here a two party system along the lines of the US or neo presidentialism where the elections also devolve around to a referendum on the highest post in the country. This would free the system from populist pressures and lead, hopefully to the paradigm shift that I deem to be the pivotal factor in determining the Indian states renewed posture and approach to the conflict. Then, perhaps, a strong leader may have the gumption and the oomph to decide and resolve the issue once for all-taking the entire country with him/her.Other wise, it will be plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Lahore Attacks:A RAW Deal or Chicken Coming Home to Roost?
The frontal (and brazen) attacks on the cultural heart of Pakistan points out to the systemic nature of problems that Pakistan faces. These attacks along with the general state of contemporary Pakistan have the making or the trappings of a bizarre Kafkaesque drama unfolding in Pakistan. As a corollary, credence is lent to the oft repeated assertion that the ‘land of the pure’ is in the grips(or throes) of a severe identity crisis and is essentially at war with itself. It is too facile and simplistic to finger point at either India’s intelligence services or the usual run of the mill ‘foreign hand’ thing. The coordinated assaults in tandem with gory instances of suicide bombings across Pakistan come at a critical juncture: the expansion of war by Pakistan’s state apparatus (or the army) in Pakistan’s tribal areas and given the choice of targets is clearly meant to send a strong signal or make a strong statement. That is, the people orchestrating these daring attacks are demonstrating their ability to challenging the writ of the fragile Pakistani state anywhere in the territory of Pakistan, by implication mocking the state apparatus of Pakistan and thereby demonstrating that they too can enlarge or expand the conflict and take the battle to the enemy.(The enemy here is obviously the Pakistani state).In this asymmetric conflict or more appropriately war, the losers are the state and people of Pakistan. The question that arises or the apposite question is: why have things come to this bloody pass? The answer is complicated given the complex and complicated tangle that Pakistan has gotten itself into. However a sober analysis of the nature of the Pakistani state, its concomitant or attendant trajectory and policy stances (or postures) may yield some insights. It stands to reason that the Pakistani state has, given the ambiguity or the dissonance between the rhetoric that underpinned its formation, the nature of its state formation and its various permutations and combinations, has morphed into a national security state with the army at the heart of this institutional complex. Supported by a web of intelligence agencies and other ancillary state apparatii, this condition has entailed the morphing or degenerating of politics or the political process into mere administration. A natural concomitant of this degeneration is the cacophony of unrealistic demands and pressures on the Pakistani state which, in turn has led to a loss of focus and concentration of resources towards insalubrious ends. Hence state society relations in Pakistan remain or are comprehensively at odds with each other. Allied or wedded to this condition is the foreign policy stance of the Pakistani state. It(stance) means constant confrontation with its largest neighbor , India and the kind of interest in Afghanistan whose nature has been unsalutary for Pakistan and its politics. The means employed has entailed instrumentalizing Pakistan’s youth bulge towards ends that the Pakistani establishment deems as its overarching national interest. The concatenation of these elements, in turn has meant that Pakistan, in its external posture plays a double game or adopts a posture where a delicate balancing act is inherent .Pak-United States relation and its various permutations and combinations may be a classic instance of this. In this situation, state society relations suffer and mutual acrimony and suspicion defines the relationship between the US and Pakistan. On one end of the spectrum, Pakistan’s cosying up to the US in the post Cold War world lends grist to the mill of conspiracy theories whose manifestation is rampant anti Americanism and at the other end disaffection on part of those who have been coopted in the foreign policy posture of Pakistan.The results of all these is contemporary Pakistan: a nation rent and riven by violencs and essentially at war with itself. Now after having identified some of the main features of the Pakistani state and politics inhering in it, the question morphs into: How can Pakistan come out of the problems it has brought upon itself? The answer in the form of a prescription that strikes the mind is wholesale reorientation of the Pakistani state, its political economy, the alignment of the Pakistani state with its society and a foreign policy posture that enables Pakistan to eke out a respectable and honorable status in the comity of nations. More concretely, this means serious introspection and the return of politics to the blight riven land. Or take recourse to a nationalism that is inclusive and reorient the state toward enabling it to meet the real and germane demands of the citizens of Pakistan. Concomitantly this may entail taking a fresh look at relations between India and Pakistan and the dispute over Kashmir. The gelling of these factors or elements and vigorous efforts to bring these to fruition may lead to a naya Pakistan: a Pakistan defined by peace, prosperity and happiness for all its denizens and at peace with itself and the world at large.
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Can Pakistan Resolve its Existential Trilemma?
Can Pakistan resolve its existential crisis?
Wajahat Qazi Pakistan's contemporary condition - a state of anarchy and the possibility of drifting into a failed (or fragile) state - may best be characterized by a formulation referred to as an existential trilemma: severe domestic strife and anarchy, the possibility of balkanization or bantustanization, and last bit not the least, the loss of its sovereign status. This condition, it would appear accrues from the nature of its state-society relations, a melange of a torturous history, apparently unbridgeable ethnic cleavages, unresponsive mediatory state institutions, and the ideological glue that is supposed to accord coherence to Pakistan.
It is held that its foreign policy posture - whether it be its interest in Afghanistan or Kashmir accrues from these sets of conditions. What is in dispute or under contention is not the nature or merit of these assertions or contentions but the solution that is held to be the panacea for Pakistan's teeming troubles: the election of Asif Ali Zardari to the highest office of the country and the elevation of the party he 'inherited' by default, the Pakistan People's Party. We are told that this 'solution' would accord plenitude and closure to the beleaguered nation state. Validation for this assertion is provided or offered by organs of the United Sates' foreign policy apparatus, working, apparently at cross purposes and begetting a situation where organizational prestige and turf wars acquire precedence over the national interests of either Pakistan or the United States.This, in essence, and counter intuitively means or implies legitimizing the current drift in or of Pakistan’s politics: the politics of vendetta, revenge and humiliation. A clear cut instance of this is the 'plan' or 'program' that Zardari’s PPP as laid out for the 'revival' of Pakistan: populism (wheat subsidies that ultimately mean draining the exchequer and a prelude to queuing up at the twin sisters-World Bank and the IMF aimed to undercut Nawaz Sharrif's appeal in the Punjab, recourse to feudal (or medieval) politics to garner vote share in Baluchistan, and hitching Pakistan's wagon to the national security paradigms of the US or offering Pakistan's services to the United States on a platter without a genuine quid pro quo. Now the question(s) are: what is this strange set of these assumptions that, at best, present a temporary expedient and at worst a full circle for Pakistan predicated upon? And what is the confidence of my view premised upon? The answer to the former question, necessarily a speculative exercise, may lie in the nature of post September 11 Pakistan-US alliance politics, the US electoral cycle, the need for a recalibration of military-politico strategy in Afghanistan, and the inter turf conflict that defines or characterizes the various organs of the US' Foreign Policy establishment. And to former, I would posit or draw the attention to the nature of Pakistan's polity and its contemporary drift and or condition. Before venturing further, I would like to point out that this approach, that appears to be gaining traction and some legitimacy, both within and without Pakistan guarantees a full circle for Pakistan. That is, the lurch from one extreme to another, where the interregnum(s) and pauses are filled by ostensible representatives of the people, and inevitably followed by the 'intervention' of the armed forces to restore equilibrium. This 'recipe', needless to point out, may not be what Pakistan or the world or international community needs. Pakistan, in order to be a valuable and valued member of the international community and a proud and a confident post modern nation state needs the kind of course correction that it is genuine: one that comes from within and in the process genuine support and assurances by the international community is accorded to it. Now how can this be brought about? Or what kind of course correction (or review) would constitute a solution that rids Pakistan of its persistent malignancies?First and foremost, a review of the nature of Pakistan is warranted. Its identity needs to be firmly anchored and grounded in or under a framework or grid that redeems it in its own eyes. This may mean taking recourse to a nationalism that binds its various peoples under a common framework and subsumes the pulls and pressures that ethnic differences lead to. Second, is the urgent need to consolidate the remit of the Pakistani state and make or render its sovereignty real. Third would be to impart expansive citizenship rights to its people so that every Pakistani has or holds a stake in Pakistan. This 'prescription', of course, means improved and efficient governance. A follow up step would be to realign Pakistan's political economy and wed it to the global economy. Another reform that merits a review is its education system: the focus and thrust of the reform should be on imparting an expansive and eclectic education. A natural corollary, that effectives ties these together and brings them to fruition would perhaps be to rejig Pakistan’s political system and render it into a more effective unitary and centralized state- at least for the foreseeable future. Last but not the least, is the review of nature of its alliance with the wounded hegemon, the United States. Mutual cynicism, both on part of the US and Pakistan permeates alliance. This has to change. And this change is contingent on designing and articulating a grand strategy toward Pakistan that factors in the elements identified in this article and importantly not mean ignoring influential institutions of Pakistan: the Army and the ISI. Bringing them, on board or rendering them into genuine partners may be a prudent strategy or tactic. Otherwise it will be plus ca change, plus la meme thing with Pakistan performing a balancing act- either over Afghanistan or Kashmir, and the US venting out in ways that further alienate Pakistanis. Now the question: Can Zardari or the PPP pull it off? His past record, even after discounting or accounting for a born again Zardari does not offer much of a consolation. Neither, as we have seen, does his 'plan' or 'program'. It is here that the United States' role acquires salience: it (the US) for the sake of its national and security interests should discard expediency look harder and engage promising leaders and politicians among the younger cohort. That is, the kind who are not yet tainted by either bitterness or cynicism and have a vision for Pakistan. This may mean looking beyond the party system(s) or affiliations, culling the best and the brightest and engaging them. A clear cut delineation and implementation of the elements identified here may hopefully resolve Pakistan’s existential trilemma and enable it to reclaim honorable and legitimate space, the one articulated by its visionary founder for itslef in the post modern world and a dynamic, vibrant and plural Pakistan may come into being.
Wajahat Qazi Pakistan's contemporary condition - a state of anarchy and the possibility of drifting into a failed (or fragile) state - may best be characterized by a formulation referred to as an existential trilemma: severe domestic strife and anarchy, the possibility of balkanization or bantustanization, and last bit not the least, the loss of its sovereign status. This condition, it would appear accrues from the nature of its state-society relations, a melange of a torturous history, apparently unbridgeable ethnic cleavages, unresponsive mediatory state institutions, and the ideological glue that is supposed to accord coherence to Pakistan.
It is held that its foreign policy posture - whether it be its interest in Afghanistan or Kashmir accrues from these sets of conditions. What is in dispute or under contention is not the nature or merit of these assertions or contentions but the solution that is held to be the panacea for Pakistan's teeming troubles: the election of Asif Ali Zardari to the highest office of the country and the elevation of the party he 'inherited' by default, the Pakistan People's Party. We are told that this 'solution' would accord plenitude and closure to the beleaguered nation state. Validation for this assertion is provided or offered by organs of the United Sates' foreign policy apparatus, working, apparently at cross purposes and begetting a situation where organizational prestige and turf wars acquire precedence over the national interests of either Pakistan or the United States.This, in essence, and counter intuitively means or implies legitimizing the current drift in or of Pakistan’s politics: the politics of vendetta, revenge and humiliation. A clear cut instance of this is the 'plan' or 'program' that Zardari’s PPP as laid out for the 'revival' of Pakistan: populism (wheat subsidies that ultimately mean draining the exchequer and a prelude to queuing up at the twin sisters-World Bank and the IMF aimed to undercut Nawaz Sharrif's appeal in the Punjab, recourse to feudal (or medieval) politics to garner vote share in Baluchistan, and hitching Pakistan's wagon to the national security paradigms of the US or offering Pakistan's services to the United States on a platter without a genuine quid pro quo. Now the question(s) are: what is this strange set of these assumptions that, at best, present a temporary expedient and at worst a full circle for Pakistan predicated upon? And what is the confidence of my view premised upon? The answer to the former question, necessarily a speculative exercise, may lie in the nature of post September 11 Pakistan-US alliance politics, the US electoral cycle, the need for a recalibration of military-politico strategy in Afghanistan, and the inter turf conflict that defines or characterizes the various organs of the US' Foreign Policy establishment. And to former, I would posit or draw the attention to the nature of Pakistan's polity and its contemporary drift and or condition. Before venturing further, I would like to point out that this approach, that appears to be gaining traction and some legitimacy, both within and without Pakistan guarantees a full circle for Pakistan. That is, the lurch from one extreme to another, where the interregnum(s) and pauses are filled by ostensible representatives of the people, and inevitably followed by the 'intervention' of the armed forces to restore equilibrium. This 'recipe', needless to point out, may not be what Pakistan or the world or international community needs. Pakistan, in order to be a valuable and valued member of the international community and a proud and a confident post modern nation state needs the kind of course correction that it is genuine: one that comes from within and in the process genuine support and assurances by the international community is accorded to it. Now how can this be brought about? Or what kind of course correction (or review) would constitute a solution that rids Pakistan of its persistent malignancies?First and foremost, a review of the nature of Pakistan is warranted. Its identity needs to be firmly anchored and grounded in or under a framework or grid that redeems it in its own eyes. This may mean taking recourse to a nationalism that binds its various peoples under a common framework and subsumes the pulls and pressures that ethnic differences lead to. Second, is the urgent need to consolidate the remit of the Pakistani state and make or render its sovereignty real. Third would be to impart expansive citizenship rights to its people so that every Pakistani has or holds a stake in Pakistan. This 'prescription', of course, means improved and efficient governance. A follow up step would be to realign Pakistan's political economy and wed it to the global economy. Another reform that merits a review is its education system: the focus and thrust of the reform should be on imparting an expansive and eclectic education. A natural corollary, that effectives ties these together and brings them to fruition would perhaps be to rejig Pakistan’s political system and render it into a more effective unitary and centralized state- at least for the foreseeable future. Last but not the least, is the review of nature of its alliance with the wounded hegemon, the United States. Mutual cynicism, both on part of the US and Pakistan permeates alliance. This has to change. And this change is contingent on designing and articulating a grand strategy toward Pakistan that factors in the elements identified in this article and importantly not mean ignoring influential institutions of Pakistan: the Army and the ISI. Bringing them, on board or rendering them into genuine partners may be a prudent strategy or tactic. Otherwise it will be plus ca change, plus la meme thing with Pakistan performing a balancing act- either over Afghanistan or Kashmir, and the US venting out in ways that further alienate Pakistanis. Now the question: Can Zardari or the PPP pull it off? His past record, even after discounting or accounting for a born again Zardari does not offer much of a consolation. Neither, as we have seen, does his 'plan' or 'program'. It is here that the United States' role acquires salience: it (the US) for the sake of its national and security interests should discard expediency look harder and engage promising leaders and politicians among the younger cohort. That is, the kind who are not yet tainted by either bitterness or cynicism and have a vision for Pakistan. This may mean looking beyond the party system(s) or affiliations, culling the best and the brightest and engaging them. A clear cut delineation and implementation of the elements identified here may hopefully resolve Pakistan’s existential trilemma and enable it to reclaim honorable and legitimate space, the one articulated by its visionary founder for itslef in the post modern world and a dynamic, vibrant and plural Pakistan may come into being.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Ragda II
Ragda II
The deaths of stone pelting young men(or boys) followed by the alleged gang rape - murder most foul of women at the cusp of their lives- and the violence and counter violence on part of the state apparatus of Jammu and Kashmir is most likely to lead a rerun of Ragda I. Given the eerie parallel, in terms of the prelude to Ragda I, this (rerun) may be referred to as Ragda II. The prelude to Ragda II amid the cacophony of noise and clamor that it has bred among both ‘mainstream’ and separatist politicians raises more questions than it answers. The sets of inferences to drawn are manifold. However the major or main inference or even conclusion that one may draw is the obvious: Kashmir remains unsettled and the dispute over it warrants or merits resolution. This obvious ‘catechism’ is more poignant and salient given the rather spontaneity of the politics of protest- post militarization of the conflict-where the initiative has been taken away from the separatist political leadership and that it is the ‘ordinary’ people who are at the fore front of the protest. The question or sets of questions that arise are: are these protests likely to go in vain? Will the prelude generate a momentum that in the final scheme of things will go awry like the previous one? What role does the separatist leadership play? What could be the potential response of the ‘mainstream’ leadership? Is demilitarization the answer to the problems inherent in a wide and deep troop spread in the valley? Or is it merely a component of the dispute and thus merely a micro phenomenon that coud lbe be obviated once the real issue is resolved? Elaborating on the answer(s) to each of these questions is beyond the scope of this piece. However, the theme that cuts across these sets of questions is, to repeat myself, Kashmir or the dispute over Kashmir aches or cries for a resolution and that the attritive capabilities/capacities of the Indian state have not laid to rest the nature of the dispute over Kashmir. Now the question is what can or what is to be done to both alleviate the potential of Ragda II and simultaneously alleviate to the extent it can be , the dispute over Kashmir.(The answer is necessarily both normative as well as descriptive…).First, let us explore the context. That is, the structural problems and the concomitant identity crisis that Pakistan, the country that deems itself to be party to the dispute, has gotten into. It is increasingly obvious that this neighboring country has gotten into such a morass that it can no longer follow up on the dispute over Kashmir with the vigor it used and as far as the eye can see it may drop its claim on Kashmir and focus on its internal problems. Second, even a cursory examination of the politics of the sole superpower, the United States suggests that it’s interest in the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir is a far cry from the principle of self determination of peoples and is more related to its domestic politics and homeland security.(This further reduces the scope of Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir given that Pakistan is now in the ‘ eye of the storm’, so to speak).Third and perhaps more important is the increase in the prestige and power of India .It(India) is increasingly headed to great power status and is gradually becoming or morphing into a custodian of the international system and structure. Fourth, the international system is so clogged and , to use a strong word, clogged that it may not bear the creation of new states.(The process of decolonization that , in some senses, generated failed states is another worry and a burden that the international system is loath to bear again. This I am sure must be a factor in the superpower calculus of decision making..). So where does this leave the dispute over Kashmir and the concomitant politics of protest where the separatist leadership has lost the initiative and appears to be taking its cues from the protests itself? As is implied in the preceding discussion, maximalist claims are more likely to lead to a situation which begets an impasse (or a dead end) and the energy of the prelude to Ragda II would stand dissipated. This calls for introspection on part of all parties involved and calls for the solution that is non zero sum or in other words a win win situation. The obvious solution that strikes the mind is a kind of solution that calls for creativity and expansiveness on the relevant parties. Or in other words work toward a solution that allows all parties to converge on a solution that allows all parties an exit that is honorable and ultimately which leads to a lasting solution to the dispute.The obvious solution or more specifically the contours of the solution may be to ask for Greater Autonomy for the state.This as far as the eye can see may be the most optimal solution given the complexities of ths dispute and the arguments elaborated in the piece. This (solution) may be palatable to all parties given the context while the others may mean mere posturing or , to use a metaphor, tilting against the windmills. Panning of this solution may also mean or entail obviating the problems and issues that have arisen out of the catalysts that have spurred the current protest: death , rapine and murder. So let us make haste slowly and work with due diligence and sincerity toward ends that are attainable.
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